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The aim of this thesis is to look into the 2013 government shutdown in the United
States of America, which lasted from October 1 to October 16, with the purpose of
studying  the  internal  divisions  that  were  created  or  made  visible  within  the
Congressional manifestation of the Republican Party. The main sources for the thesis
are  a  pair  of  shutdown-inducing  letters  from  Mark  Meadows  and  Mike  Lee  to
Congressional leaders, the final tallies of the votes that ended the shutdown, as well as
media sources. The initial shutdown-related division was made apparent in the summer
of  2013  between  the  14  Senators  and  80  Representatives  supporting  through  the
Meadows and Lee letters a "defunding strategy", which ultimately led to the shutdown,
and  the  32  Senators  and  152  Representatives  who  opposed  using  said  strategy  to
combat President Obama's healthcare reform. The final division was between the 18
Senators and 144 Representatives who opposed the final compromise that ended the
shutdown and the 27 Senators and 87 Representatives who voted in favor of reopening
the government. Republicans who did not sign one of the letters and who voted for the
final  compromise  were  more  likely  to  have  experience  of  previous  government
shutdowns;  more  likely  to  have  seniority  over  their  colleagues;  more  likely  to  be
ideologically moderate; less likely to be affiliated with the Tea Party; and more likely to
hail from competitive districts or states, while the opposite is true for the Republicans
who  had  signed  one  of  the  letters  and  who  opposed  the  final  compromise.  While
Congressional leaders like John Boehner and Mitch McConnell were largely successful
in  navigating  the  crisis,  it  was  the  leading  defunder  Ted  Cruz  in  particular  who
benefited from the national attention that resulted from the shutdown. While the Tea
Party movement was a necessary precondition for elevating politicians such as Cruz,
the shutdown crisis should not be understood as an event caused by the Tea Party alone.
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At the stroke of midnight, as October of 2013 began, so too started the first government shutdown
for seventeen years in the United States of America. Approximately 850,000 non-essential federal
workers  were  furloughed  without  pay,  and  another  1,3  million  had  to  report  to  work  without
knowing when they would be paid. All around the country offices were closed and activities ceased.
National park entrances were padlocked, food safety inspections were halted and civil litigation in
the courts was put on hold. Severe economic damage started accruing as all but the most crucial of
government services grinded to a halt.1
Partisan politics were the root cause of this sixteen-day-long crisis. Three and a half  years had
passed since the Democratic President Barack Obama had signed his healthcare reform, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act – or Obamacare2 – into law, but all that time had done nothing
to mollify Republican opposition to the law, especially within the party's ultra-conservative Tea
Party wing. As the fiscal year of 2013 drew to a close at  the end of September, Congressional
Republicans  moved  to  use  the  budget-setting  power  of  the  Republican-controlled  House  of
Representatives to deprive Obamacare of funding. The aim of this maneuver was to delay by a year
the implementation of the law, which otherwise was to  finally begin on October  the first.  The
Democrat-controlled  Senate,  however,  voted  for  a  version  of  this  appropriations  continuing
resolution  bill  that  did  not  include  language  defunding  Obamacare.  With  the  two  houses  of
Congress so deadlocked, and with no will to compromise on either side, the government shutdown
began on  October the first.3
The government shutdown crisis was exacerbated by and intertwined with a continuation of another
crisis that had to do with the nation's debt ceiling. The debt ceiling, which is a legislative cap on the
amount of debt that can be issued by the Treasury, had usually been raised by Congress almost as a
matter of routine. Recent years, however, and the summer of 2011 especially, had seen Democrats
1 The New York Times (NYT) 1.10.2013, On Day 1, Parks Close, Workers Stay Home and 'Panda Cam' Goes Dark;
The Washington Post 30.9.2013, Absolutely everything you need to know about how the government shutdown will 
work;
Office of Management and Budget 2013, 13.
2 Following a long political tradition of derisive renaming, the Republican opponents of the law started calling it 
"Obamacare" long before it was even passed. The name was eventually co-opted and embraced by Obama and other 
Democrats and has thus mostly lost its pejorative nature. In the interest of brevity and without bias the colloquial 
term Obamacare is therefore mostly used in this thesis.
3 The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 28.9.2013, GOP Hunts for Budget Plan – As Shutdown Deadline Nears, Senate Strips
Health-Law Defunding Pushed by House Conservatives;
NYT 30.9.2013, The Battle in Congress On Spending and Debt.
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and Republicans increasingly at loggerheads over raising the limit. The hard-fought compromise of
2011 had set the debt ceiling at 16,394 trillion Dollars, a level that was reached in January of 2013.4
Careful political maneuvering postponed the crisis for a few months, but by May the Treasury had
to  once  again  deploy what  is  known as  "extraordinary measures"  to  prevent  the  country from
defaulting on its debts. On September 25, just as the nation was preparing itself for the possibility of
a  government  shutdown,  the  Treasury  announced  that  unless  the  ceiling  were  raised,  the
extraordinary measures would be exhausted by October 17. To follow after that would be the first
ever default  of the United States of America, the shockwaves of which could, according to the
Treasury, trigger a global financial crisis on the scale of the 2008 crisis or worse. With the funding
of the government and the raising of the debt ceiling so entwined, by time and politicians' discourse
both, the stakes were high indeed during the shutdown.5
Public opinion turned sour very quickly at the face of such political and economic brinkmanship.
Polls taken during the shutdown saw Americans' approval of Congress plummet from an already
low level. A Gallup poll measured a drop of eight percentage points in one month from 19% to 11%
– only one percentage point higher than the all-time low6. Another poll, by Public Policy Polling,
found an even worse approval of 8% for the Congress, all the while reporting, somewhat gleefully,
the results that "Americans like Witches, the IRS, and even Hemorrhoids better than Congress"7.
What is especially noteworthy, however, is that the shutdown hurt the Republican brand much more
than that of the Democrats. A poll by Gallup released on October 9 found that the approval rating of
the Republican party had fallen ten percentage points in one month to an all-time low of 28%, while
the Democrats suffered a drop of four percentage points8.  Poll after poll produced similar results,
both during and after the shutdown. For example, a CNN/ORC poll conducted after the shutdown
found 75% of respondents saying that most Republican members of Congress do not deserve to get
re-elected,  while  a  Washington  Post/ABC  News  poll  found  that  53%  of  Americans  blame
Congressional Republicans for the shutdown, with only 29% blaming President Obama9.
4 Austin & Levit 2013, 1,9.
5 Austin & Levit 2013, 1–7;
U.S Department of the Treasury 2013, 1-6.
6 Gallup poll 7.10.2013, Congress' Job Approval Falls to 11% Amid Gov't Shutdown.
7 PPP poll 8.10.2013, Congress losing out to Zombies, Wall Street, and...Hipsters.
8 Gallup poll 9.10.2013, Republican Party Favorability Sinks to Record Low.
9 The Washington Post 22.10.2013, Democrats lead the generic ballot by 8. That's not enough to win the majority.
3
Moreover, the disastrous outcome of the government shutdown crisis for the Republican brand was
not exactly hard to predict. In fact, many Congressional Republicans did foresee the damage. Many
of them were already working at the hill during the last, equally calamitous shutdown. Many of
these Congressional Republicans spoke out against the shutdown strategy before it was adopted. Yet
these voices were overruled by other, louder forces within the party.
How did this happen? Why did the more aggressive voices prevail? Was the Democratic Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi right when she dubbed the crisis a "Tea Party shutdown of government"10 or
were there other forces at work? Answering these questions will tell us much about the modern
Republican party and the voter coalition that produced its Congressional manifestation.
10 NYT 1.10.2013, Pelosi Derides 'Tea Party Shutdown'.
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1.1. Questions, sources and prior research
The following are then the main questions to which answers are sought in this thesis. What kinds of
internal  divisions  or factions within the Republican party were created or made visible by and
during the government shutdown of 2013? What factors can be used to explain the emergence or
existence  of  these  specific  divisions?  How  did  the  shutdown  influence  the  balance  of  power
between these factions? Who were the winners and who were the losers?
When  looking  at  the  factors  that  can  be  used  to  explain  the  emergence  of  these  factions,  the
following additional questions are posed. Did the factions differ by the seniority of their members
or by experience of previous shutdowns? What about ideology or Tea Party affiliation? What about
other differences in the makeup of the Representatives' districts such as the degree to which the
voters lean towards the Republican party? Finally, was the shutdown a device for advancing the
personal political aspirations of some of the more visible Congressional Republicans or was it all
about the party itself?
The main focus of the thesis is the sixteen days of the shutdown itself, from October the first to the
sixteenth, and the divisions that were created or made visible during that period. Understanding
these divisions and their manifestations, however, requires looking to the past: to the politics of the
Obama-era,  to  past  elections  –  especially  the  Republican  wave  of  2010  –  and  even  to  past
government shutdowns all the way to 1976. The goal of this thesis is therefore not only to gain
understanding of the state of the Republican coalition in 2013, but also to place it within the larger
historical context of the coalition's continuing evolution.
Internal tensions within a political party can be a difficult subject to study, since politicians often
have incentives to keep them hidden. Drawn-out government shutdowns like the one in 2013 make
things easier, however, for two reasons. Firstly, the high stakes and tension may produce cracks in
the politicians' message discipline. Secondly, once a shutdown has begun, it forces politicians to
pick sides: in 2013 all Congressional Republicans11 had to vote either for or against ending the
politically damaging sixteen-day-long shutdown.
11 All except Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe, who got a pass on the vote due to some emergency heart surgery 
(Reuters 8.10.2013, Oklahoma Senator Inhofe recovering at home after heart surgery), and Florida Representative 
C.W. Bill Yong who wass ill and died two days after the shutdown ended (NYT 18.10.2013, C.W. Bill Young, 
Longtime Florida Congressman, Dies at 82).
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This is reflected in the two principal types of sources used in this thesis. On the one hand there are
sources from the instances where the politicians had to take sides: most importantly the votes that
ended the shutdown on October 1612, but also two letters sent to the Congressional leadership by
Representative13 Mark Meadows and Senator Mike Lee in the late summer of 201314. The letters
urged the leadership to  link defunding or delaying Obamacare to  funding the government,  and
heavy pressure was put on all Congressional Republicans to sign the letters by the proponents of the
plan as well as various outside groups. Refusal to sign the letters in the face of such efforts will
point to more moderate Republicans, while comparing the signatures in the letters to the vote tally
for the bill to reopen government will help to distinguish the true hardliners from those who cracked
under shutdown pressure.
These votes and letters alone are not enough, however. There were also important instances where
individual  Republicans  chose to  take  stances  on the  defunding strategy as  well  as  the  internal
dynamics of their Congressional caucus. These messages were directed to the media, and so media
sources are needed too. It is of course impossible to include the whole scope of the American media
landscape. In order to get a good overall picture of the Congressional Republican voices in the court
of public opinion and to ensure that no major developments are missed, the internet versions of two
major newspapers are used in this thesis and checked for shutdown-related articles in the latter half
of 2013. Other newspaper and media sources are used where relevant, but these primary newspaper
sources constitute the media coverage "safety net" for the thesis. The newspapers in question are
The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times.
There are several reasons for this choice. In terms of daily circulation they were the largest and the
second largest American newspaper in 2013 respectively15.  They,  and especially The New York
Times, also benefit from what is known as the prestige effect: other media actors follow their lead
and imitate their  choices in stories, contexts and analyses16.  Both newspapers have also exerted
significant influence in previous negotiations between the Obama administration and Congressional
Republicans: in the 2011 fiscal crisis, for example, both newspapers managed to change the course
of  the  negotiations  by  reporting  on  developments  of  secret  and  delicate  negotiations  between
12 Senate Roll Call Vote number 219, 16.10.2013;
House of Representatives Roll Call Vote number 550, 16.10.2013.
13 Unless otherwise noted, all the Congressional politicians named in this thesis are members of the Republican party.
14 Letter from Representative Meadows to Speaker Boehner and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, 21.8.2013;
Letter from Senator Lee to Senate Majority Leader Reid, 25.7.2013.
15 Alliance for Audited Media 2013.
16 Graber 2009, 39.
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President Obama and Speaker Boehner17. 
Furthermore, while they are both considered to be relatively neutral in political stance, there is a
slight difference with The New York Times perceived to offer a more liberal point of view18, while
The Wall Street Journal is perceived to represent a slightly more conservative view. This is true
especially of The Wall Street Journal editorial pages, where critical opinions of Obamacare are very
common – and read  with great  care  by Congressional  Republicans.19 During the  shutdown the
editorial  team also often directed its  ire  to  those Republicans  who attacked said law using the
defunding strategy20. The use of both these newspapers thus provides a balanced view and makes
sure no single point of view dominates.
The purpose of using newspaper sources is to survey instances of Republican participation in public
debate through the media – as opposed to establishing what happened during the shutdown, which
is not the goal for the use of newspaper sources in this thesis. Still,  a methodological problem
common to studying recent  events presents  itself:  there is  currently a dearth of usable primary
sources for accurately describing the events of the 2013 shutdown in detail. More sources might
become available in the future, thus making it possible to describe exhaustively the minutia of the
shutdown itself. In the meanwhile, newspaper sources point to and reflect actual events, but should
not be thought as a suitable means of writing event history. This methdological distinction should be
kept in mind, as should its corollary: the purpose of this thesis is not to exhaustively explain what
happened  during  the  2013  government  shutdown,  but  rather  to  establish  how  the  Republican
reactions to the events reveal aspects of the internal divisions within the party – hence the use of
newspaper sources.
There  is  a  clear  need  for  more  research  on  the  current  state  of  the  Republican  Congressional
coalition, as well as the phenomenon of the government shutdowns itself. The dramatic rise of the
Tea Party movement has thankfully produced much research, but not enough of that research has
focused on the Congressional manifestation of the movement – perhaps because finding out exactly
which politicians represent the movement is so difficult. Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson
17 Woodward 2012, 166–167,179–180,184.
18 The New York Times 23.7.2016, Why Readers See The Times as Liberal. (Note: for the convenience of the reader, 
the unabbreviated names of The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal are used in the footnotes when the 
articles in question are dated before or after the principal period of interest for the shutdown, ie. the latter half of the 
year 2013.)
19 Woodward 2012, 179.
20 For example: WSJ 2.10.2013, A GOP Shutdown Strategy.
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have produced a good overview of the movement21, while Jill Lepore has written an illuminating
account of the Tea Party's understanding of history22. Meanwhile Bryan Gervais and Irwin Morris
have produced some rare examples of in-depth analysis on the Congressional manifestations of Tea
Party enthuasism23.  But  even more  is  needed.  The  modern  Republican  Congressional  coalition
cannot be understood by looking at the Tea Party alone. The Tea Party faction is just one part of the
whole, and interconnected with many other radically different parts. A more holistic view of how
the different and often competing factions influence each other's evolution and success is needed.
This thesis aims to fulfill a small part of that need.
Research on government shutdowns is even more scarce, though hopefully the drama of the 2013
shutdown moves people into action in the near future. The Congressional Research Service has
produced several reports of quality on the subject – and many of them are cited in this thesis – but
what is especially needed, and what the CRS papers understandably de-emphasize, is research into
the political game that leads to shutdowns and occurs during them. This has largely been the domain
of journalists, and they have done a well enough job of it, but there is ample room for historians and
political scientists too.
21 Skocpol & Williamson 2012.
22 Lepore 2011.
23 Gervais & Morris 2014;
Gervais & Morris 2015.
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1.2. The historical and political context of the 2013 government shutdown
The 2013 government shutdown was the latest chapter in the decades-long history of American
budget showdowns on the one hand, and in the even longer history of contested healthcare reform
on the other hand. Furthermore, for the Republicans, it was a flashpoint in the constant internal
struggle for direction that all political parties must endure. Before turning to the manifestations of
this struggle in October of 2013, three aspects of the shutdown's historical and political contest must
be examined in more detail.
Firstly, there is Obamacare itself as the spark for the conservatives' anger; secondly, the Tea Party
movement that harnessed that anger and took an active lead in promoting the strategy of defunding
Obamacare; and thirdly, the political phenomenon of the government shutdown itself, which in the
plans of the defunders was to be the leverage for forcing concessions out of the Democrats.
9
1.2.1. Obamacare
"This is a big fucking deal."
Vice President Joseph Biden to President Obama, unaware that the microphone in front
of them at the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signing ceremony was on.24
President Barack Obama came into office in 2009 following a campaign promising transformational
change for America. Despite the immediate concerns of dealing with an unfolding financial crisis,
the Obama administration was determined to make good on that promise and set about deciding on
which front to use its newfound political capital. The one that was chosen was among the most
hotly contested in American politics – healthcare. Aside from the various vested interests in the
healthcare industry itself, any reform of healthcare was also almost certainly going to provoke an
especially vehement response from the Republicans.
The  reason  why  healthcare  had  become  such  a  dangerous  political  issue  has  to  do  with  the
enormous scope of its problems: compared to most other Western countries American healthcare is
both  extremely expensive  and very inefficient.  The  healthcare  industry employs  a  sixth  of  the
American workforce, with a cost of three trillion dollars in 2014, which is more than the combined
healthcare costs of the ten next biggest spenders in the world. Yet much of that money is wasted.
Americans pay fifty percent more for prescription drugs than other Westerners because there are no
price  controls  for  such  drugs.  Hospitals  and doctors  are  paid  for  the  amount  of  services  they
perform rather than their results, which gives them an incentive to order excessive testing. In 2008
alone, 750 billion dollars, or the equivalent of that year's defense budget,  were wasted on excessive
healthcare  spending,  according  to  Peter  Orszag,  who  at  the  time  was  running  the  nonpartisan
Congressional Budget Office. Besides the rampant costs, coverage was also a problem. By 2007
there were forty-five million Americans without any health-insurance and the number was rising
every year.25
By the time Obama was elected President, the history of hotly-contested debates about healthcare
24 Woodward 2012, 46.
25 Brill 2015, loc 81,92,131,410,954–964. (Chapters 1,2 and 4) An e-book version of America's Bitter Pill was 
accessed for this thesis. As the settings such as font size of an individual e-reader device can influence on what page 
any given portion of the text appears, location numbering is used instead of page numbers when referring to 
America's Bitter Pill. Location numbering works just like conventional page numbers, but since the amount of 
location numbers in a book is much higher than that of page numbers, the references will always point to the right 
place. For the convinience of readers following along a paper version of America's Bitter Pill, all the references to 
the book in this thesis will also note the chapter in which the referred text is situated.
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and health insurance reform ran back almost a hundred years. Starting with Theodore Roosevelt's
calls  for  healthcare  for  industry  in  1912  and  the  Progressives'  calls  in  1915  for  compulsory
healthcare,  most  reform efforts  failed at  the face of  Congressional  opposition.  Franklin Delano
Roosevelt failed to include national health insurance in his New Deal reforms in the 1930's, while
Harry  Truman  was  similarly  unsuccessful  in  the  1940's.  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  became  the  first
President to enact a large-scale reform with his Great Society bills in the early 1960's. The two
major parts of the American healthcare system established by Johnson, Medicare and Medicaid – a
state sponsored health insurance scheme for the elderly and a medical services program for low
income citizens  respectively – became fixed points  in  the  political  terrain on which the  future
political battles about further reform were fought. Among the notable – and unsuccessful – attempts
were the abortive reforms by Presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, as well as
various efforts by the Democratic Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy.26
The stances of the two main parties on healthcare reform in the 21st century have tended to reflect
their basic ideological tenets. The views of the Democrats have ranged from fervent support of a
single payer system modeled after many other Western countries to more modest reform proposals
tempered by the perceived political  difficulty of achieving a single payer  system in the United
States27.  The Republicans on the other hand have sought to push back on the deficit generating
aspects  of  the current  system, for  example  by turning the Medicare into  a  voucher  system for
buying  private  healthcare  and  operating  Medicaid  through  block  grants  given  to  states  –  an
approach championed by and associated with Representative Paul Ryan28.
In view of the ferocity of opposition that any reform of healthcare would be sure to incite, Obama
and his team decided against the kind of more radical single payer overhaul favored by a large
portion  of  the  Democratic  base  and  adopted  instead  an  approach  from  their  past  and  future
opponents, which focused on extending the coverage of healthcare rather than cutting its costs. It
was an approach first popularized in 1989 by Stuart Butler29, the director of the conservative think
tank Heritage Foundation30. It contained ideas that had been unsuccessfully pursued by president
Nixon before Watergate. A crucial part of it called individual mandate had been favored by Hillary
26 Hoffman 2009, 1–8.
27 Brill 2015, loc 302–321. (Chapter 2)
28 Letter and analysis of the Rivlin-Ryan Plan from the Congressional Budget Office to Representative Paul Ryan.
29 Butler 1989, 6.
30 Butler himself has pushed back on the idea that the Heritage Foundation invented the individual mandate. What is 
certain, at the very least, is that Butler and the Foundation served to popularise and mainstream the idea. Butler 
explained his more recent views on the individual mandate's evolution and his own opposition to the idea in a 2012 
USA Today column. (Butler in USA Today 6.2.2012, Don't blame Heritage for ObamaCare mandate.)
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Clinton and opposed by Obama in their hard-fought primary battle. Moreover, and most famously, it
had been tried before, once and successfully, in Massachusetts by Mitt Romney, Obama's eventual
opponent in the 2012 presidential elections. Romneycare, as it was usually called, soon became the
blueprint for Obama's healthcare reform.31
Romneycare had three central features, colloquially called "the three legs of the stool", that also
became  the  core  principles  of  Obamacare.  Firstly,  the  insurers  in  the  individual  market  are
prohibited from excluding people with preexisting conditions from their insurance plans. Secondly,
there is something called the individual mandate, which states that anybody who is not insured by
an employer or covered by Medicare or Medicaid has to purchase insurance or face a fine for not
complying. Thirdly, the people who cannot afford to purchase insurance receive federal subsidies
for buying it. In most states Obamacare subsidies are paid for people earning less than four times
the federal poverty level. This last leg is from and old plan proposed by President Nixon. Nixon's
plan also included another crucial part for Romney's and Obama's reforms, which stated that, apart
from the very smallest businesses, employers must keep offering insurance for their workers or face
a penalty. This was a way of preserving much of the old American model of employer-provided
insurance and limiting the amount of new subsidies that would have to be paid out.32
Getting Obamacare passed in Congress was not going to be easy, but it seemed that the Democrats
had  just  enough  seats  to  pull  it  off.  They  had  a  comfortable  majority  in  the  House  of
Representatives and with the help of the Independent Senator Bernie Sanders, who usually voted
with the Democrats, exactly the sixty votes they needed to overcome the threat of a filibuster in the
Senate. But there were no extra votes to spare.33
After long negotiations led by the Majority Leader Harry Reid, and many concessions awarded to
individual Senators, the Senate Democrats passed their version of Obamacare on Christmas Eve of
2009  with  exactly  sixty  votes.  The  two  Republican  Senators  that  had  been  courted  by  the
Democrats,  Olympia Snowe and Chuck Grassley,  both decided against supporting the law.  The
Democrat-controlled House had passed its own, differing version of the law on November 7, and
the only thing left was to go through a process called reconciliation where the differences in the two
bills would be hammered out and both bodies would then vote on the final product.34
31 Brill 2015, loc 489,508–545,751–765,1015. (Chapters 2,3 and 5)
32 Brill 2015, loc 547–566. (Chapter 2)
33 Brill 2015, loc 2105–2115. (Chapter 9)
34 Brill 2015, loc 2433,2788–2804,2827–2865,2899–2904. (Chapters 10 and 11)
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The differences between the two bills were large though – and seemingly insurmountable. Not a
single vote could be lost on the Senate side. The negotiations soon bogged down and tempers flared.
Then,  in  what  should  have  been  an  easy  Democrat  victory,  the  Republicans  picked  up  the
Massachusetts  Senate  seat  of  the  recently  deceased  healthcare  reformist  Ted  Kennedy.  Partly
because of unforced errors by the Democratic candidate and partly because of a groundswell of Tea
Party enthusiasm, the seat went to a Republican state Senator called Scott Brown. For a moment it
seemed like Obamacare would progress no further.35
In retrospect, however, Brown's Tea Party fuelled election turned out to be a blessing in disguise for
the healthcare reform. It ended the bickering between House and Senate Democrats and turned their
attention to one final way of passing the law. Under Senate rules a reconciliation bill whose changes
are mostly deemed to be about financial matters can be approved by a simple majority rather than
sixty votes. This meant that only a small portion of the House Democrats'  grievances could be
addressed,  but  it  was  a  way out  of  what  was  quickly turning  into  a  political  disaster  and  the
Democrats took it. The reconciled bill was passed on March 21 and President Obama signed the bill
into law two days later.36
Having lost the fight against Obamacare in Congress, Republicans next turned to the courts to strike
down the law. It  took seven minutes after  Obama signed the law into effect  for the Attorneys
General from thirteen states to sue the federal government over it37. The main arguments of these
and many of the other suits to follow were that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and that
the Congress had abused the power of the Constitution's Commerce clause. The torrent of lawsuits
and conflicting rulings made the Supreme Court take notice and in November of 2011 it decided to
take the case on.38 
The Court came out with its ruling on the morning of June 28, 2012. The Justices of the Court were
divided with five voting to uphold the individual mandate and four voting against it. The use of the
Commerce  Clause  was  likewise  approved,  on  the  grounds  that  even  though  Congress  had for
political reasons refrained from calling the penalty for uninsured people a tax, it was a tax and thus
fell  under the purview of  the Commerce Clause.  Obamacare did not  escape entirely unscathed
however. The Supreme Court upheld a provision of the law that expanded Medicaid eligibility, but
35 Trende 2012, 120–121;
Brill 2015, loc 2975–3014. (Chapter 12)
36 Brill 2015, loc 3048–3129,3154. (Chapter 12)
37 USA Today 23.3.2010, 13 attorneys general sue over health care overhaul.
38 The Washington Post 14.11.2011, Supreme Court to hear challenge to Obama’s health-care overhaul.
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struck out its enforcement mechanism: the federal government could not threaten to withold the
Medicaid funds of  states  that  would or  could not  comply with the new expansion.  Republican
Governors could now opt out of an important part of the law. Even still, the Supreme Court decision
was a huge victory for the Obama administration.39
Obamacare was now undisputedly the law of the land. All that remained was for the administration
to put up the new exchanges and implement the law. This implementation, however, would turn out
to be a disaster. Furthermore, there was a new faction on the ascendancy within the ranks of the
Republican party, and it was not one for giving up on Obamacare.
39 Musumeci 2012, 1–6.
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1.2.2. The rise of the Tea Party movement
"I have a message from the Tea Party, a message that is loud and clear and does not mince words.
We've come to take our government back."
Senator Rand Paul in his 2010 primary election victory speech.40
It began with an on-air speech on CNBC's morning news on February 19, 200941. CNBC's business
commentator Rick Santelli  had had it  with the economic policies of the one-month-old Obama
administration, and reporting on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange he let it  all out.
"This is America! How many of you people want to pay for your neighbors' mortgage [...]?" he
bellowed to cheering commodities brokers. Encouraged by them and the studio commentators he
went on, berating President Obama, his team and the administration's policies. The crucial sound
bite came a few moments later: "We're thinking of having a Chicago Tea Party in July. All you
capitalists that want to show up to Lake Michigan, I'm going to start organizing." Little did Santelli
know that in just a few hours his rant would start off what many political scientists have dubbed the
most important mass movement in American politics in the 21st century42.43
Santelli's  rant became a  rallying  cry for  Republican  activists  demoralized  by Obama's  victory.
Within days local Tea Party groups had sprung up all around the country and the media coverage
started accruing. Hundreds marched in protest in a dozen cities on February 27. By Tax Day in
April, it was thousands, by September in Washington D.C., tens of thousands. Something big was
happening, but who were these Tea Party activists and what did they want?44
Studies have shown that Tea Party activists are mostly older, white, middle-class men. A significant
portion of them have had earlier experience with participation in politics. Most Tea Partiers identify
themselves  as  conservative Republicans,  though they are actually more conservative than other
Republican  voters.45 The  Tea  Party counts  within  its  ranks  both  socially conservative  religious
voters as well as a smaller subset of libertarian voters, but the radically different views of these two
groups on social issues has, on the whole, been a source of remarkably little contention withing the
40 Paul 2011, xi.
41 CNBC video of Rick Santelli's rant, 19.2.2009.
42 Gervais & Morris 2014, 21.
43 Lepore 2011, 3.
44 Williamson, Skocpol & Coggin 2011, 26.
45 Skocpol & Williamson 2012, 23–29,40–42.
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movement46.
The  Tea  Party  movement  is  very  loosely  organized  with  hundreds  of  small  local  groups  of
grassroots activists. While there are a few notable national organizations that claim to represent the
movement such as Tea Party Express and Tea Party Patriots, as well as several other conservative
actors  that  hold  sway  over  parts  of  the  movement  through  funding  and  ideology,  like
FreedomWorks, the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute, no one actor can truly claim to
speak for the Tea Party. The closest thing to a universally recognized Tea Party voice has been Fox
News, which by its reporting has helped to shape, sustain and strengthen the Tea Party movement.47
The lack of official Tea Party leadership has also made it possible for billionaires such as the Koch
brothers and many others to tap into the movement's popularity and to use it to prod the Republican
party rightwards and to advocate ultra-free-market policies of their preference48.
Ideologically the Tea Party is usually understood to stand for small government, but the truth is
more complex than that. The movement is not against all forms of government largesse, but rather
against handouts to the undeserving. Most Tea Party activists see themselves as ordinary workers
and they feel that, through their long years of hard work, they have earned their share of programs
like Medicare. Tea Party activists tend to think it is those people who have not earned it, like young
people  and  immigrants,  that  the  government  is  unjustly  rewarding.49 There  is  in  fact  a  strong
undercurrent of generational angst over societal change in the Tea Party's angry rhetoric. Older Tea
Party  activists  often  see  "the  country  of  their  youth"  in  decline,  partly  due  to  growing
multiculturalism and changing societal norms. This "grey versus brown divide" does indeed have
some explanatory power when it comes to understanding the Tea Party.50
The Tea Party's name – in itself a valuable political asset – must also be taken into account when
assessing the movement's ideology. To many Tea Party activists their struggle against a government
running rampant is akin to the struggle of those early patriots dumping tea into the Boston harbor.
Many of the themes, figures and accoplishments of the American revolution form a core part of the
Tea Party parlance: the liberties won during the Revolution and codified in the Constitution are
threatened, the Founding Fathers would be rolling in their graves if they knew what was going on,
and  so  on.  Yet  there  is  a  case  to  be  made  that  the  Tea  Party  rhetoric  goes  beyond  mere
46 Skocpol & Williamson 2012, 34–40.
47 Williamson, Skocpol & Coggin 2011, 27–30.
48 Skocpol & Williamson 2012, 100–106.
49 Williamson, Skocpol & Coggin 2011, 32–34.
50 Skocpol & Williamson 2012, 74–76,204.
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Revolutionary analogies. According to journalist and historian Jill Lepore much Tea Party thinking
is  not  only historically  incorrect,  but  is  in  fact  antihistory,  in  which  today's  political  struggles
actually become a part of the Revolution and subject to the Founding Fathers' critical glare. Thus it
is not just that the Founding Fathers would be livid over Obamacare if they were alive, but rather
they are actively expressing their disapproval  right now, breaking down the very barriers of time
and death.51
The Tea Party movement finally cashed in on its support in the 2010 midterm elections. The scope
of the Republican victory was enormous: the party won six seats in the Senate and sixty-three seats
in the House of Representatives, where they also regained the majority. Both counts and especially
the House of Representatives score – which was the best for the Republicans in 72 years – include
Tea Party affiliated  candidates.  The Republican  gains  were  especially  large  among suburbanite
voters  and working class  whites,  who abandoned the  Democrats  in  droves.  For  a  party whose
imminent demise or at least a devolution into a regional party of southern whites had been foreseen
by various doomsayers only two years earlier this was quite a rebound. The Tea Party was a major
factor in this turnaround and its supporters knew it.52
The strong views of Tea Party candidates do not always turn out to be electoral boons for the
Republicans, however. The 2010 Senate election in particular proves this. Capturing the Senate that
year was always going to be a tall order for the Republicans as they would have needed to win ten
new seats, but it was in theory doable. Tea Party backed candidates who had displaced more centrist
candidates in the Republican primaries went to win Senate seats in places like Utah, Kentucky and
Florida, but these were strong candidates despite their stark views. Elsewhere, successful Tea Party
primary challenges produced candidates who were much too extreme and unabashed in their views
for the general election53. Sharron Angle in Nevada54, Christine O'Donnel in Delaware55 and Ken
Buck  in  Colorado56 all  went  to  lose  what  should  have  been  very  easy  Senate  battles  for  the
Republicans. Had more centrist Republican candidates prevailed in their place the control of the
Senate would have been split  50-50. Vice President  Biden's  tie-breaking vote would have then
resolved most votes in the Democrats' favor, but nevertheless it can be argued that despite all the
51 Lepore 2011, 7–9.
52 Trende 2012, 123–124,127–128;
Sabato 2011, 16–20,22–24.
53 Trende 2012, 135–137.
54 Raslston 2011, 315–323.
55 Hoff 2011, 209–215.
56 Masket 2011, 189–196,200–206.
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energy that the Tea Party brought into the 2010 elections, they also robbed the Republican party of
an important, if symbolic, Senate victory.57
The Tea Party was also active in the 2012 presidential elections and especially in the Republican
primaries where large parts  of the movement strove to influence the direction of their  party by
choosing a sufficiently conservative candidate as the Republican standard bearer. Tea Party activists
first fixated on one of their own, Representative Michele Bachmann of Minnesota, but when her
fortunes faded, Tea Partiers switched their support to a series of other leading alternatives to the
front runner Mitt Romney. First Bachmann, then Texas Governor Rick Perry, then Pizza mogul
Herman Cain, then former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and finally former Pennsylvania
Senator Rick Santorum all benefited from varying but always substantial Tea Party support, only to
be ultimately defeated by Romney.58
As  representatives  of  a  loose  and  fundamentally  anti-hierarchical  mass  movement,  Tea  Party
affiliated politicians have an uneasy relationship with organizing in the Congress. The most notable
institutional manifestation of Tea Party ideas is the House Tea Party Caucus, that was founded by
Representative  Michele  Bachmann  in  July  of  2010.  A total  of  52  members  joined  the  first
incarnation of the caucus in the 111th Congress. After the Republican wave of 2010, many, but not
all, newly sworn-in Tea Partiers joined the caucus. It had 60 members at the height of its activity in
the 112th Congress, but the 2012 elections whittled the number down to 50. The caucus became
inactive after those elections59.60
Membership in the House Tea Party Caucus was a problematic measure of Tea Party affiliation even
before  its  dormancy,  since  not  all  notable  Tea  Party  backed  politicians  joined,  and  since
Representatives could in theory also join it without having any real grass-roots support.  For the
113th Congress, the best institutional measure of Tea Party activity in the House was the Liberty
Caucus, a smaller, more ideologically "pure" caucus chaired by Representative Justin Amash of
Michigan.61
57 Skocpol & Williamson 2012, 163–167.
58 Klemetti 2012, 2,12;
RealClearPolitics polling averages page for the 2012 Republican Presidential Nomination.
59 Roll Call 26.2.2015, New Tea Party Caucus Chairman: DHS Fight Could Break the GOP.
60 Bloomberg 8.11.2012, Tea Party Freshmen to Become Sophomores by Keeping House Seats;
CNN 29.7.2011, Who is the Tea Party Caucus in the House?
61 Gervais & Morris 2015, 7–8.
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The Senate, meanwhile, has a small and informal Tea Party caucus that was formed during the 112 th
Congress by Senators Rand Paul of Kentucky, Mike Lee of Utah and Jim DeMint of South Carolina
–  who  later  retired  and  became  the  President  of  the  Heritage  Foundation.  Notable  Tea  Party
favorites such as Marco Rubio were courted, but the only joiner since DeMint's departure has been
Jerry Moran of Kansas62. Despite their reluctance to join the informal caucus, several other Senators
have displayed support for the Tea Party movement.63
Pinning down exactly who is a Tea Party Republican thus remains the biggest difficulty of studying
the movement's impact in Congress. Bryan Gervais and Irwin Morris suggest looking more closely
at the relationships between the politicians and the movement. They divide these relations into a
four-way typology of high and low support from the Tea Party movement and organizations to the
politicians (including campaign contributions), as well as high and low self-association with the
movement by the politicians (including Caucus membership). This methodology thus underlines the
fact that not all politicians who associate themselves with the Tea Party have actual support from
the grassroots, and conversely not all politicians who are liked by the movement chose to solicit its
support or join its activities. This method captures the intricacies of the relationships between the
politicians and the movement in a way that produces useful results beyond the obvious cases of
clear-cut Tea Party types and their centrist Republican competitors. Even still, the very nature of the
Tea  Party  movement  precludes  exact  attributions  of  membership  and  representation  of  the
movement in Congress: practices like strategic campaign spending by organizations with ties to the
movement, as well as the possibility of ideologically "non-pure" politicians joining caucuses ensure
that a certain amount of haziness always remains. This is worth bearing in mind.64
For the purposes of this thesis, an approach that errs on the side of caution is adopted. Tea Party
affiliated members in the 113th House of Representatives are counted as those who were members of
the official Tea Party Caucus65 or the Liberty Caucus66 that came to stand for many of the same
ideas following the former's  dormancy.  Adding together the members of Tea Party and Liberty
caucuses produces a list containing the names of 66 Representatives.67
62 Politico 27.1.2011, 4th Senator joins Tea Party Caucus.
63 Roll Call 14.11.2011, Senate Tea Party Caucus to Meet Jan. 27.
64 Gervais & Morris 2014, 2–8.
65 CNN 29.7.2011, Who is the Tea Party Caucus in the House?
66 No official list of Liberty Caucus members exists. The list used in this thesis is based on cross-referencing the 
internet-pages of Republican Representatives with media reports on the Liberty Caucus, and the signatures on 
several open letters available on the Facebook-page of the Liberty Caucus.
67 A full list can be found in the Appendix at the end of this thesis.
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The amount of ambiguity that must be embraced when considering the Tea Party's Congressional
organization is even larger in the Senate than in the House. In this thesis, the four actual members of
the informal Tea Party caucus are naturally included in the count of Tea Party affiliated Senators.
When it comes to the 2013 government shutdown at least, the Texas freshman Senator Ted Cruz,
whose election was largely contingent on Tea Party support, must also be included in the count for
his central role in channeling Tea Party anger during the shutdown. Several others could easily be
included. DeMint's successor Tim Scott, for example, is well loved by the Tea Party and no stranger
to  Tea  Party events68.  Neither  is  Louisiana's  David  Vitter69.  Several  others  have  either  tried  to
associate themselves with the movement or have received largely unsolicited support from it. For
the  purposes  of  this  thesis  Senators  Paul,  Lee,  Moran  and  Cruz  at  least are  considered  to  be
representatives of the Tea Party. Such ambiguity unfortunately comes with the Tea Party territory.
68 ABC News 17.12.2012, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley Names Tim Scott to Replace Jim DeMint in Senate.
69 The Washington Post 10.4.2010, David Vitter rides the tea party wave.
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1.2.3. Government shutdowns in the United States
"I'll buy you a Coke Zero if you can tell me what the government shutdown was about in '95. What
was the issue? Nobody remembers!"
Senator Lindsey Graham, claiming there is no consensus on why the last shutdown happened.70
The fact that the federal government of the United States even can shut down stems ultimately from
the  checks  and  balances  of  the  American  Constitution.  "No  money  shall  be  drawn  from  the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law," the Constitution states71, thus giving
the 435 members of the House of Representatives and the hundred Senators significant power over
the American purse string. This power is normally exercised through annual appropriation bills that
fund discretionary government spending for a given fiscal year72.73
Twelve such appropriation bills are needed: one for each of the appropriations subcommittees in
both the House of Representatives  and the Senate.  After  both houses of Congress  have passed
twelve identical  appropriation bills  they are taken to the President for signing.  If  the President
declines, the veto can only be overturned by a two-thirds majority vote in both houses. If passing
these twelve regular appropriation bills proves too difficult politically, there is also the option of
funding the government through continuing resolutions. These typically maintain the funding levels
of the previous fiscal year until a specified date. The idea is to provide more time for negotiations,
though it is not impossible or even uncommon for the Congress to use continuing resolutions to
fund government spending through an entire fiscal year.74
 
It is important to note that in recent years discretionary spending has comprised only about 35–39%
of  all  federal  spending.  The rest  is  taken up almost  entirely by mandatory spending,  which  is
spending required by law, mainly for entitlements such as Medicare and Medicaid. The remainder
of federal spending is comprised of net interest payments of public debt.75
A government shutdown can therefore be defined as a situation where a new fiscal year begins
70 NYT 28.9.2013, Last Shutdown a Lesson Lost on Capitol Hill.
71 U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 9.
72 American fiscal years always run from the 1st of October to the 30th of September of the following year. The 2013 
government shutdown was thus a fight over the funding for the fiscal year of 2014.
73 Tollestrup 2014, 1–2.
74 Grant 2004, 68–70;
Tollestrup 2014, 1–10,12–15.
75 Tollestrup 2014, ii.
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without  the  Congress  having  passed  appropriation  laws  for  discretionary  federal  spending  and
where the resulting funding gap forces government services to start shutting down. Some services
funded by discretionary spending are exempted from shutting down by provisions of a law called
the Antideficiency Act. These mainly pertain to national security and public safety. The employees
performing the exempted services have to do so without pay, though both them and the furloughed
non-essential employees have generally received retroactive payment.76
There have been eighteen instances of federal funding gaps since the modern budgeting process was
adopted in 1976. Even though these are all sometimes referred to as government shutdowns, they
did not all result in significant, or in some cases any, disruption in government services. Thus a
distinction could be made between mere funding gaps and real  shutdowns, as well  as between
partial and full government shutdowns.77
The history of these eighteen confrontations can be divided into three rough phases. The first six
funding gaps, starting with Gerald Ford's first and only partial shutdown in 1976 and ending with
Jimmy Carter's fifth and final shutdown in 1979, make up the first phase. The funding gaps in this
phase  were  relatively  long,  ranging  from eight  to  eighteen  days,  but  did  not  entail  dramatic
disruptions in government services and thus were not always actual shutdowns. Disagreements over
abortion rights were often at the forefront of these early funding gap fights.78
The nature of federal funding gaps changed due to a pair of opinions issued by the Attorney General
Benjamin Civiletti in 1980 and 1981. His stricter interpretation of the Antideficiency Act made it all
but impossible for federal agencies to maintain most functions during funding gaps, as they had
done earlier.79 As a result of these raised stakes, the second phase of the history of federal funding
gaps, from 1981 to 1990, is characterized by very short funding gaps. There were seven of them
during the Reagan years, none of them longer than three days, as well as one three-day shutdown
during the presidency of George H.W. Bush in 1990. The notable points of contention during this
second  phase  included  domestic  budget  cuts  and  strong  defense  spending,  both  advocated  by
President Reagan.80
76 Brass 2014, 8,12–13;
The Washington Post 30.9.2013, Absolutely everything you need to know about how the government shutdown will 
work.
77 Tollestrup 2013, ii.
78 The Washington Post 25.9.2013, Here is every previous government shutdown, why they happened and how they 
ended.
79 Tollestrup 2013, 1–4.
80 The Washington Post 25.9.2013, Here is every previous government shutdown, why they happened and how they 
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If the first phase of the history of federal funding gaps in the United States was characterized by
long  gaps  with  relatively  low  stakes81,  and  the  second  phase  with  higher  stakes  and  shorter
durations, then the third modern phase combines the worst qualities from both earlier eras. The twin
shutdowns of 1995 and 1996, as well as the 2013 government shutdown were both lengthy and
disruptive.
The  modern  phase  started  in  1995  with  two  connected  fights  between  the  newly  resurgent
Republicans, led by the Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, and the Democrats, who were led by
President Bill Clinton. The Republicans had won large gains in the 1994 elections, in which they
campaigned on a  series  of  promises  called  Contract  with  America.  Once in  power  they set  to
fulfilling  those  promises  by,  among  other  things,  cutting  entitlement  spending,  curbing
environmental  legislation  and  seeking  a  Constitutional  amendment  that  would  require  federal
budgets to be balanced. Clinton would not comply, however, and neither did many of these attempts
pass in the Senate. The Republicans then turned to an abortive threat over preventing the raising of
the debt ceiling, and when that failed, to demanding concessions in the budget negotiations. On
November 13, 1995 a Continuing Resolution funding the government expired and President Clinton
vetoed its replacement, thus starting the first fiscal year 1996 shutdown.82
The shutdown lasted for five days and caused 800,000 federal employees to be furloughed. Three of
the thirteen83 regular appropriation bills had been passed before the shutdown, so its effects, though
unprecedented  in  scale,  were  not  quite  as  large  as  they  could  have  been  otherwise.  The  first
shutdown ended with the passing of two continued resolutions that gave the opposing parties until
December 15 to continue their negotiations while the affected agencies received 75% of their pre-
shutdown funding.84
The negotiations resulted in four new appropriation bills, but little else. The government shut down
again on December 15 and 280,000 federal employees were sent home. At 21 days this was to be
the  longest  government  shutdown  to  date.  It  finally  ended  on  January  6,  1996  in  Republican
ended.
81 The "lower stakes" for the early funding gaps and shutdowns are of course in reference to the actual shutdown 
effects, and not the political fights themselves, which often were very bitterly fought.
82 Grant 2004, 49–50;
Brass 2014, 14–15;
The 1995–1996 Government Shutdown section of the webpage of the Regional Oral History Office of the Bacroft 
Library of the University of California, Berkley research project "Slayig the Dragon of Debt".
83 Thirteen was the total amount of regular appopriation bills at the time. The number has since been reduced to 
twelve.
84 Tollestrup 2013, 4–5.
23
capitulation. The shutdown had been more severe than any in history – the Office of Management
and Budget later estimated the costs of the twin shutdowns at at least 1,4 billion Dollars – and
consequently the associated public pressure was significant. The Republicans lost the blame game
decisively. Conventional Washington wisdom often links both Bill Clinton's re-election and Newt
Gingrich's later fall from grace to the fiscal year 1996 shutdowns85.86
Viewed in this historical context, the 2013 government shutdown has to be situated on the severe
end of the spectrum alongside with the preceding fiscal year 1996 shutdowns. At sixteen days it is
only shorter than the second Clinton era shutdown and the 18-days-long shutdown in 1978, when
President  Carter  and the  Republicans  fought  over  abortion  and  funding  for  a  nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier ship.87
In fact, it could be argued that the 2013 government shutdown was the most severe in history. The
1978 shutdown preceded the Civiletti opinions and was thus less disruptive in scope than modern
shutdowns, while the fiscal year 1996 shutdowns were only partial thanks to the appropriation bills
passed before it began. None of the twelve appropriation bills were passed before October the first,
2013, and therefore the 850,000 furloughed federal employees, out of a total of about 2.9 million,
represented all government services funded by discretionary spending. The only exception in 2013,
besides the usual essential workers exempted by the Antideficiency Act, were military personnel as
well as some Defense Department workers and civilian contractors who were all insulated from the
shutdown by a bipartisan bill hurried to President Obama's desk the night before the shutdown88.89
The negative economic impact of the 2013 government shutdown was certainly the largest of all
shutdowns to  date.  According to  the Office  of  Management  and Budget,  the equivalent  of  6.6
million days of work was not performed due to furloughs, while retroactive back pay for this non-
existent  work  later  cost  2.5  billion  Dollars90.  Meanwhile  the  Council  of  Economic  Advisers
estimates that annualized GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2013 was reduced by 0.25 percentage
points, while private-sector job-growth was diminished by 120,000 new jobs during the shutdown
85 Brookings Institute 25.9.2013, How Clinton Won the Government Shutdown Fight & Why Obama Will Too.
86 Grant 2004, 29,53;
Brass 2014, 14–15,32–33;
The 1995–1996 Government Shutdown section of the webpage of the Regional Oral History Office of the Bacroft 
Library of the University of California, Berkley research project "Slayig the Dragon of Debt".
87 The Washington Post 25.9.2013, Here is every previous government shutdown, why they happened and how they 
ended.
88 Politico 30.9.2013, Obama to sign military pay bill.
89 Brass 2014, 15.
90 Office of Management and Budget 2013, 4.
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itself91. 
It  is clear,  then, that the 2013 government shutdown was very exensive. A long history of past
funding gaps and shutdowns also suggests that the shutdown's harmful effects would not escape
public notice. The fact that the risks involved in shutting down the government were so apparent
makes  the  Republican  strategy  especially  interesting.  It  is  now  time  to  turn  to  Congressional
Republicans and see if the internal division within their ranks can explain the adoption of this risky
approach.
91 Council of Economic Advisers 2013, 1.
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2. The government shutdown divides Congressional Republicans
“We’ve  had  enough  of  the  disunity  in  our  party.  The  headlines  are  Republicans  fighting
Republicans. This will unite us.”
Majority Leader Eric Cantor, explaining the decision to adopt the defunding strategy.92
In recent decades it has traditionally been the Democratic party that has suffered more from an
unruly caucus and internal divisions. Recent years have seen tables turn, however, and internal strife
has come to be associated more and more with the Republicans – especially after the rise of the Tea
Party movement and the 2010 midterm elections. Since then there have been several high-profile
cases of disagreement inside the caucus: endorsements for colleagues' primary opponents, attack
ads, derailments of bipartisan negotiations – most notably in the summer of 2011 when pressure
from politicians affiliated with the Tea Party forced the party leadership to scuttle grand budget
bargain talks with the White House and settle for a much more modest agreement – and many
others. There even was a coup attempt against Speaker Boehner in the beginning of January 2013
that failed only by six votes. In short, tensions inside the caucus were higher than at any time in
recent memory.93
This was then the context in which the decisions that led to the government shutdown of 2013 were
taken. The caucus had shifted to the right ideologically, and as a result, the more moderate and
centrist members were anxious over the direction of the party, the more conservative members were
unsatisfied about not being heard, and the leadership was left with the difficult task of trying to
reconcile  these  differences  all  the  while  trying  to  govern  and  seek  better  positions  for  future
elections.
And Obamacare still existed. That it was a bad law, a catastrophe in waiting, or even an existential
threat to the way of thinking that made the United States great – these were about the only things
that all the Congressional Republicans could agree on. What was left was figuring out how to get
rid of it.
92 The Atlantic 30.9.2013, Countdown to Shutdown: A Primer on Where Budget Wrangling Stands.
93 Politico Magazine Jan/Feb 2015, The Prisoner of Capitol Hill.
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2.1. Prelude to shutdown: Meadows and Lee letters to Congressional leadership
"James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 58 that the "power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded
as the most complete and effectual weapon ... for obtaining redress of every grievance..." We look
forward to collaborating to defund one of the largest grievances of our time and to restore patient-
centered healthcare in America."
The concluding words of Representative Meadows's letter urging his leaders to defund Obamacare.94
The idea of combatting Obamacare through the Congressional appropriations process surfaced well
before October of 2013. The defunding strategy gained substantial traction following the July 2012
ruling by the Supreme Court in favor of the law, and through the rest of the year and the beginning
of 2013 it percolated through conservative circles and came up in advocacy group talking points.
The proponents of the plan in Congress set the initial target for a showdown at March 27, 2013,
when a Continuing Resolution was set to expire. In the Senate, freshmen Ted Cruz of Texas and
Mike Lee of Utah tried to drum up support for the defunding strategy, but as their chamber was
Democrat-controlled, such a move could only work with support in the House of Representatives.
Georgia's Tom Graves pushed for defunding in the House95, but the Speaker John Boehner chose to
pursue other avenues of attack at the time. The defunders had to bide their time.96
The drawing of the initial shutdown battle-lines started in the summer when Representative Mark
Meadows of North Carolina and Senator Lee drafted open letters to their Congressional leaders,
urging them to adopt the defunding strategy. The current Continuing Resolution was set to expire at
the end of September and this was thus the last opportunity to act before Obamacare went into
effect.  Outside groups,  including Tea Party types and well-funded advocacy organizations both,
rallied behind the effort and put considerable pressure on Congressional Republicans to sign one of
the two letters.97
The  letters  received  mixed  response  inside  the  Republican  Congressional  caucus.  There  were
certainly those who adopted the strategy with enthusiasm. In addition to Cruz, Lee and Meadows,
Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, who already at the time was considered one of the party's top
candidates for the 2016 presidential elections, became a leading early proponent of the idea. From
94  Letter from Representative Meadows to Speaker Boehner and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, 21.8.2013.
95  WSJ 28.9.2013, Budget Battle: Unbending Lawmaker Highlights GOP Leaders' Challenge.
96  NYT 6.10.2013, A Federal Crisis Months in the Planning.
97  NYT 6.10.2013, A Federal Crisis Months in the Planning.
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the Senate leadership the holders of the second and third highest positions, Minority Whip John
Cornyn of Texas and Conference Chairman John Thune of South Dakota both gave the Lee letter
additional weight by signing, though Cornyn later withdrew his sinature.98
Many members were vocal in their opposition to the strategy from the start. Senator John McCain
of Arizona, the party's presidential candidate in 2008, spoke out against threatening shutdown in a
talk-show  interview  in  July,  saying  that,  "most  Americans  are  really  tired  of  those  kinds  of
shenanigans  here  in  Washington."99 Representative  and  Deputy  Majority  Whip  Tom  Cole  of
Oklahoma  called  the  shutdown  strategy  a  "temper  tantrum"  and  "blackmail"100.  Probably  the
harshest early critic was Senator Richard Burr of North Carolina, who, when asked about Senator
Lee's efforts to link defunding Obamacare to funding the government, said, "I think it's the dumbest
idea I've ever heard of. Listen, as long as Barack Obama is president, the Affordable Care Act is
going to be law101."
Burr's  comments  did not  go unnoticed  by proponents  of  the plan  or  their  backers.  The Senate
Conservatives  Fund,  a  fundraising  organization  for  the  promotion  of  very  conservative  Senate
candidates  quickly turned on Burr  and other  Senate  Republicans  they felt  had  endangered  the
defunding strategy. Besides Burr, the Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell from Kentucky,
Senators Alexander from Tennessee, Johnny Isakson from Georgia, Jeff Flake from Arizona102, Thad
Cochran from Mississippi and Lindsey Graham from South Carolina became the targets for radio
attack ads. Heritage Action, the political arm of the Heritage Foundation, meanwhile, organized an
aggressive  internet  ad  campaign  against  a  hundred  Representatives  that  had  not  signed  the
Meadows letter. The vehemence involved in these pressure campaigns is well encapsulated by the
words of the Senate Conservatives Fund's Executive Director Matt Hoskins: “Any Republican who
votes to give Obama a single penny to implement Obamacare is part of the problem and should be
defeated. Any Republican who votes to fund Obamacare should have a primary challenger.”103
98  Talking Points Memo 24.7.2013, Conservatives Desperately Move To Shut Down Government Over Obamacare;
The Hill 23.7.2013, Government shutdown looms over ObamaCare;
The Huffington Post 25.7.2013, Richard Burr: Mike Lee Government Shutdown Threat 'Dumbest Idea I've Ever 
Heard Of'.
99  The Hill 23.7.2013, Government shutdown looms over ObamaCare.
100 Talking Points Memo 25.7.2013, Senior GOPer: Try To Ditch Obamacare? Dream On, Guys.
101 National Journal 18.8.2013, The Defund Obamacare Movement Falls on Hard Times.
102 NYT 23.9.2013, Deeply Conservative, but Not an Obama-Hater.
103 Politico 29.9.2013, Senate Conservatives Fund roils GOP;
NYT 6.10.2013, A Federal Crisis Months in the Planning;
Bloomberg 22.8.2013, Defunding of Heath Law Backed by 80 House Republicans;
The Hill 23.7.2013, Government shutdown looms over ObamaCare.
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The  defunders  were  not  alone  in  putting  pressure  on  those  who  disagreed  with  them.  Senate
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell went on record and told the press he wished to honor the budget
deal made with the Democrats in 2011, which would entail funding Obamacare. His influence has
also been linked to the withdrawal of signatures of John Cornyn and four other Senators who had
initially signed the letter. Besides Cornyn, Senators John Boozman from Arkansas, Mark Kirk from
Illinois,  Roger Wicker from Mississippi and Kelly Ayotte from New Hampshire withdrew their
signatures. Backing down from the letter had a political cost, of course, and all involved were put
under renewed pressure from the defunders and their allies. Senator Conrnyn, for example, received
almost 15,000 emails from a campaign organized by FreedomWorks alone104, while he also became
a target for radio attack ads.105
The final tally for the letters was 14 out of 46 Republicans in the Senate for the Lee letter106 and 80
out of 232 for the Meadows letter107 in the House of Representatives108. A full list of the signatures
can be found in the Appendix at the end of this thesis. This was then the initial dividing line inside
the Republican caucus in the shutdown fight. Perhaps some doubted that a shutdown would occur,
but the late summer fight over the letters was real enough: the millions of Dollars spent on radio
attack ads on the issue alone speak to this. In any case the shutdown did eventually start and the
fight over the defunding strategy gained new urgency.
Before moving on to the shutdown, however, it is worth taking a quick look at the personas of the
three politicians who became symbols of the shutdown due to their late summer activities. Mike
Lee, the first ever successful Tea Party ouster of an established incumbent, became the youngest
member  of  the  Senate  following  the  2010  elections.  Despite  numerous  family  connections  to
traditional party elites in both parties – Democratic Senate Leader Harry Reid was Lee's Mormon
home teacher, while his father was the Solicitor General under Reagan – Lee cast his lot with the
outsiders  and  was  one  of  the  co-founders  of  the  informal  Senate  Tea  Party  Caucus.  Largely
unknown before the 2013 shutdown nationally, Lee had nonetheless established quite a following in
the Tea Party circles, partly because of his willingness to buck the party leadership when ideology
104 FreedomWorks advocacy page with an electronic form for contacting Senator Cornyn and demanding that he sign 
the Mike Lee defunding letter.
105 Talking Points Memo 24.7.2013, Conservatives Desperately Move To Shut Down Government Over Obamacare;
Politico 29.9.2013, Senate Conservatives Fund roils GOP.
106 Letter from Senator Lee to Senate Majority Leader Reid, 25.7.2013.
107 Letter from Representative Meadows to Speaker Boehner and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, 21.8.2013.
108 Alabama Congressman Mo Brooks is sometimes incorrectly named as one of the signatories, but he did not sign the
letter (Al.com 7.10.2013, Rep. Mo Broks on list of blame for government shutdown, according to website). Lists 
that include Brooks typically either have 81 names or fail to include Meadows himself.
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necessitated.109 In fact, Lee could be considered as an archetypal example of a politician with high
Tea Party support and high Tea Party self-indentification, as envisaged by Gervais and Morris.
Mark Meadows had only represented his North Carolina district in the House of Representatives for
eight months before drafting his influential letter to Speaker Boehner. Before redrawing of district
boundaries in 2012 caused the moderate Democrat incumbent of Meadow's district to retire, he had
been running a small-town sandwich shop. Meadows was vetted by local Tea Party groups before
running and has since been held in growing esteem by movement activists. Like Lee, Meadows has
had no qualms about defying the party leadership – before the shutdown or since.110
While Lee and Meadows both got their  fair  share of national spotlight for their  letters, neither
finally emerged as the most visible Republican "face" of the shutdown. That role was assumed by
Lee's frequent Senate collaborator Senator Ted Cruz from Texas. Like Meadows, Cruz was only
serving his first term when the shutdown began. He took over the seat of the retiring Senator Kay
Bailey  Hutchison  in  January  of  2013,  after  a  fiercely  contested  runoff  election  against  the
establishment-backed Republican Lieutenant-Governor David Dewhurst. Much of Cruz's backing
came from the Tea Party movement – with which he identifies himself – and he even managed to
enlist for his campaign the aid of national Tea Party stars like the Senator Jim DeMint and former
Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin. This victory quickly propelled Cruz himself to national Tea
Party stardom.111
While Cruz had been one of the early adopters of the defunding strategy and a vocal proponent of
the Meadows and Lee letters, it was only during the last week of September that he made himself
the Republican "face" of the shutdown. On September 24 he took to the Senate floor and announced
that he was going to speak out against Obamacare until he could no longer stand. While this was not
technically a filibuster112, since procedural rules prevented him from deadlocking the Senate beyond
the following noon, his 21 hour 19 minutes speech got him the national attention he wanted. The
speech drew attention to the defunding strategy and took up almost a day's worth of the Senate's
109 The Washington Post 5.2.2011, Sen. Mike Lee: A political insider refashions himself as tea party revolutionary;
CNN 1.10.2013, Architect of the brink: Meet the man behind the government shutdown.
110 Politico 28.7.2015, Who is Rep. Mark Meadows?;
CNN 1.10.2013, Architect of the brink: Meet the man behind the government shutdown.
111 The Washington Post 31.7.2012, Ted Cruz wins Republican runoff for Texas Senate seat.
112 These filibuster-like marathon speeches that nonetheless fail to meet the specifications of a proper filibuster have 
become increasingly common and popular in American politics in the past few years. Another recent example was 
Rand Paul's ten-and-a-half hour speech against government surveillance in May of 2015. A proper term is 
desperately needed for this kind of almost-filibuster. Some journalists have used "talkathon", but the current author 
would like to submit for consideration "sillybuster" or "filibusterino" (as in: Filibuster In Name Only).
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time right at the brink of the impending shutdown.113
113 WSJ 25.9.2013, Cruz's Defiant Stand Is Also a Lonely One – Senator's Long Speech, Aimed at Keeping Health-
Law Funds Out of Budget Bill, Wins Few Backers Among GOP Colleagues;
NYT 26.9.2013, Cruz, Tea Party Hero, Rankles Senate G.O.P. Colleagues.
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2.2. Early days: shutdown provokes moderate backlash
"And now, instead of talking about Obamacare, we're playing power games with each other. Think
about  how  dumb  that  is:  You  shut  down  the  government  the  same  day  that  Obamacare  is
implemented. And everybody knows this is going to be a car crash."
Representative Devin Nunes on the defunding strategy114.
Americans woke up on October the first to find that a lot had happened overnight. Registration for
Obamacare had begun –  though the huge technical problems involved were not yet apparent –  and
the federal government had shut down. If some in Congress had thought that this political game of
chicken would end with one side flinching at the last moment, as it had so often before, then the
early Tuesday morning hours must have been sobering indeed. Republican reactions were once
more mixed. On the side of the defunders, the mood was jubilant. "We've passed the witching hour
of midnight, and the sky didn't fall, nothing caved in," declared Representative Steve King of Iowa
(not to be confused with Peter T. King of New York), maintaining that "the end of Obamacare" was
now in  sight.  Other  defunders,  like  Raúl  R.  Labrador  of  Idaho,  were  similarly confident:  "It's
getting better for us. The moment where Republicans are least popular is right when the government
shuts down. But when the President continues to say he's unwilling to negotiate with the American
people, when Harry Reid says he won't even take things to conference, I don't think the American
people are going to take that too kindly."115
Many moderate Republicans were less optimistic, and several of them were willing to go on record
saying it. Representative Devin Nunes of California was one of the most vocal critics, saying it was
"moronic to shut down the government over this116" and even likening the defunders to "lemmings
with suicide vests117." Some of the other critics included Representative Peter T. King of New York,
who called the shutdown a "dead end that Ted Cruz created118," and Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona,
who  explained  that,  "We've  called  their  bluff,  and  they  didn't  blink,"  while  adding  that  the
Republicans were "likely to get the blame119."
As the first effects of the shutdown started to get noticed, the Republican leaders settled on a tactic
114 National Review 7.10.2013, Devin Nunes, Provocateur.
115 NYT 2.10.2013, A Committed Group of Conservatives Outflanks the House Leadership.
116 NYT 1.10.2013, U.S. Government Is Shutting Down In Fiscal Inpasse.
117 NYT 1.10.2013, Conservatives With a Cause: 'We're Right'.
118 NYT 1.10.2013, U.S. Government Is Shutting Down In Fiscal Inpasse.
119 NYT 2.10.2013, President Tells Republicans To 'Reopen the Government'.
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of trying to open non-controversial and popular parts of the government in a piecemeal fashion,
with House Majority Leader Eric Cantor of Virginia adding new programs to the list as soon as
complaints about them were made. The approach was denied success, however, by the Democratic
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who vowed to kill any such bill in the Senate. This left the
Republicans  with  no  apparent  moves  to  alleviate  shutdown  effects  or  to  add  pressure  to  the
Democrats.120
Pressure was building in the Republicans' own ranks instead. A private luncheon at the Senate's
Mansfield Room erupted in a shouting match on October 3, when Senators Kelly Ayotte of New
Hampshire,  Dan Coats of Indiana and Ron Johnson of Wisconsin angrily confronted Ted Cruz,
berating him for driving the party to adopting the defunding strategy and demanding what possible
endgame  the  strategy  could  have.  Senator  Ayotte  reportedly  waved  a  copy  of  a  Senate
Conservatives Fund attack ad directed at her and 24 other Republican Senators who had voted to
limit  debate in  a  procedural  Obamacare-related vote that  the Democrats had been sure to  win.
Ayotte then demanded Cruz to renounce the attacks and explain his plan. When Cruz replied, "I will
not", even more Senators stepped in to attack him, including the Minority Leader Mitch McConnell.
Several Senators gave scathing anonymous quotes after the altercation,  one calling the scene a
"lynch mob", and another saying, "It was very evident to everyone in the room that Cruz doesn't
have  a  strategy – he  never  had a  strategy,  and could  never  answer  a  question  about  what  the
endgame was. I just wish the 35 House members that have bought the snake oil that was sold could
witness what was witnessed today at lunch."121
In fact, there was a moderate group of Republicans in the House, who had started contemplating a
coup of their own. Led by Representatives Charlie Dent of Pennsylvania and Peter T. King of New
York (both archetypal examples of a Republican with low support from and low self-identification
with  the Tea Party),  the group was concerned with the  damage the  shutdown was causing the
Republican brand. Dent had earlier unsuccessfully pushed Republicans to tone down their demands
to repealing a unpopular part of Obamacare called the medical device tax122. The goal now was a
"clean" Continuing Resolution with no demands, since it was, in the group's view, the most likely
120 WSJ 3.10.2013, No Movement In Shutdown Standoff – Obama, Congressional Leaders Meet, But Neither Side 
Backs Off Budget Stance;
NYT 3.10.2013, Obama Sets Conditions For Talks: Pass Funding And Raise Debt Ceiling.
121 NYT 4.10.2013, G.O.P Elders See Liabilities In Shutdown;
WSJ 4.10.2013, The Defunding Way of Fundraising;
Politico 2.10.2013, Some colleagues angry with Cruz.
122 NYT 8.10.2013, A G.O.P. Moderate in the Middle... of a Jam.
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outcome of the shutdown anyway.  According to Representative Michael Grimm of New York, the
group was "spitballing" ideas to overcome the September 30 rule change that made it impossible for
anybody else  than  Majority Leader  Eric  Cantor  initiate  a  House  vote  on a  "clean"  Continuing
Resolution123. If successful, the group could then push for an end to the shutdown with the help of
Democratic votes. Besides Dent, King and Grimm, at least twenty-two other Representatives had
publicly supported a "clean" Continuing Resolution, while a further five others initially supported
the idea, but later walked back on their comments.124
The fact that this group was willing to share the plans for their "revolt" with journalists is indicative
of their expectations of success. Speaking out must have been a way of gaining attention to their
views and putting pressure on Speaker Boehner. No moderate rebellion ever happened.
123 Talking Points Memo 10.10.2013, The House GOP's Little Rule Change That Guaranteed A Shutdown.
124 Roll Call 2.10.2013, Republican Centrists Plot Revolt to End Government Shutdown;
The Huffington Post 1.10.2013, Here's A Tally Of Which House Republicans Are Ready To Fund The Government, 
No Strings Attached.
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2.3. The leadership team's difficult balancing act
"This isn't some damn game. The American people don't want their government shut down and
neither do I."
Speaker of the House John Boehner, on October 4, criticizing the Democrats' intransigence.125
There was immense pressure on Speaker of the House John Boehner: the Democrats' control of the
Senate  made  him  the  most  central  Republican  negotiator  during  the  shutdown  over  Mitch
McConnell. In the lead-up to the shutdown he could have probably averted the crisis at any moment
by allowing a vote in the House on the "clean" Senate bill. Democrats and moderate Republicans
would have most likely had enough votes to pass it. The fact the Boehner refused is telling of just
how much pressure he was under from the defunders. And that was only one part of the delicate
balancing act that Boehner and his leadership team had to perform to keep the various Republican
factions in Congress from turning on Boehner or each other.126
The threat of a rebellion by moderates like Charlie Dent was a part of this, as were the calls for a
"clean" Continuing Resolution. As the first week of the shutdown drew to a close these voices grew
louder. "If it went to the floor tomorrow, I could see anywhere from 50 to 75 Republicans voting for
it" Dent declared on the 6th, "and if it were a secret ballot, 150." President Obama echoed these
comments, demanding Boehner to prove his claims that not enough votes existed in the House.
Boehner held his ground though, as to acquiesce to these calls would have opened Boehner's right
flank to attacks. As the second week of the shutdown began the plan was still to extract concessions
from the Democrats while avoiding economic catastrophe in the form of defaulting.127
This  last  goal  proved harder  to  sell  to  the Republican  caucus than  many would have  guessed.
Despite  the  assurances  of  various  experts  that  hitting  the  debt  ceiling  would  trigger  an
unprecedented economic meltdown128, many Congressional Republicans were skeptical. Some, like
Senator Burr of North Carolina, Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee and Representative Justin Amash
of Michigan, questioned the October 17 date, claiming that incoming tax revenues would stave off
the default for some time still. Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky claimed there was no real deadline
125 CNN 4.10.2013, House Republicans predict government shutdown will go on for weeks.
126 WSJ, 30.9.2013, Government Heads Towards Shutdown – With Deadline Looming Tonight, No Signs of 
Resolution.
127 NYT 7.10.2013, Boehner Hews to Hard Line in Demanding Concessions From Obama;
NYT 8.10.2013, Senate Leaders Mull Raising Debt Ceiling In Challenge to House.
128 For example: U.S Department of the Treasury 2013.
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and said, "It is really irresponsible of the President to try to scare the markets." Others went even
further and questioned whether defaulting would really even be that dangerous. Representative Ted
Yoho from Florida cited his experience in running a veterinary practice and said of defaulting, “I
think, personally, it would bring stability to the world markets.129"130
Still, the leadership team's balancing act seemed to work. No moderates rebelled and there were no
real outbursts against Boehner from the Tea Partiers or other defunders on the right. A part of this
might be explained by the fact that there were no credible candidates for usurping Boehner's title
during the shutdown. Unlike in the 2011 fiscal crisis, there could be no speculation that the Majority
Leader Eric Cantor – the only feasible candidate – would challenge Boehner, since Cantor was
mired way too deep in the shutdown negotiations himself.131
The defunders were sufficiently mollified by the leadership's adoption of their strategy, and when
the Democrats did not budge and the polling started to look especially bad for the Republicans
during the second week of the shutdown132, a quiet pivot from demanding Obamacare concessions
was possible. Rather than defunding or a "clean" Continuing Resolution, Boehner's team decided to
go for broader budget talks and demands for reduced spending. For this they brought in the party's
intellectual powerhouse, Chairman of the House Budget Committee and Mitt Romney's running
mate in the 2012 presidential elections, Representative Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, who had up until
then kept a strangely low profile in the shutdown negotiations133.134
Ryan's emergence was in itself emblematic of the changing dynamics of the House Republicans'
handling of the shutdown. Over the years he had come to represent and head a loose group of
policy-orientated House Republicans whose main goal in Congress was the attainment of structural
entitlement reforms for combatting the deficit135. The plan he put forth in the negotiations to end the
shutdown was one he had advocated in an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal on Wednesday,
October 9136: extending the debt ceiling by six weeks in order to create a new deadline for broader
129 The Washington Post 7.10.2013, Wonkbook: Three terrifying quotes on the debt ceiling.
130 NYT 9.10.2013, Many in G.O.P. Offer Theory: Default Wouldn't Be That Bad.
131 NYT 5.10.2013, Boehner Urges G.O.P. Solidarity in 'Epic Battle';
Woodward 2012, 166–167,177–178.
132 WSJ 10.10.2013, Poll Finds GOP Blamed More for Shutdown – Party Scores Lowest Marks in 20-Plus Years; 
Mood Also Darkens About the Economic Impact of the Government Standoff.
133 WSJ 30.9.2013, Analysis: Obama and Ryan Stay on Sidelines.
134 NYT 11.10.2013, Talks Are Begun On Fiscal Crisis; No Quick Accord;
WSJ 11.10.2013, Obama, GOP Open Talks Over Temporary Debt Fix.
135 Woodward 2012, 135–136.
136 WSJ 9.10.2013, Here's How We Can End This Stalemate.
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budget framework talks with deficit reduction and entitlement reform as their focus.137
The problem was that this kind of deficit deal had been attempted by President Obama and House
Republicans at least five times before, most notably during a 44-day crisis in the summer of 2011,
and without much to show for it.  The Democrats felt  that the shutdown had strengthened their
negotiation position, and while the House Republicans reportedly toned down their demands from
earlier  similar  talks,  no  agreement  was  reached.  The  six-week  extension  promised  by  the
Republicans  was  simply too  short  for  the  White  House,  and thus  the  negotiations  with  House
Republicans were abandoned in favor of separate negotiations in the Senate.138
137 NYT 11.10.2013, Ryan Is Again In the Forefront For the G.O.P.;
NYT 11.10.2013, Talks Are Begun On Fiscal Crisis; No Quick Accord.
138 NYT 13.10.2013, Senate Takes Lead as House Republicans' Talks With White House Fail;
NYT 13.10.2013, Stuck on Usual Quarrel: Raising New Revenue.
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2.4. Latter days: bickering over the terms of surrender
"We've got a name for it in the House: it's called the Senate surrender caucus. Anybody who would
vote for that in the House as Republican would virtually guarantee a primary challenger."
Representative Tim Huelskamp, on the emerging Senate deal and its negotiators.139
As  the  Senate  eclipsed  the  House  in  the  negotiations,  Minority  Leader  Mitch  McConnell  of
Kentucky stepped into the national spotlight. For a Congressional leader he had kept a relatively
low profile during the first eleven days of the shutdown, a decision that some attributed to the fact
that he was facing a primary challenge from an anti-establishment candidate Matt Bevin, as well a
credible  general  election  challenge  from  Kentucky's  Democratic  Secretary  of  State  Alison
Lundergan Grimes. Once in the center of negotiations, however, he moved fast, and with the help of
Tennessee's Senator Lamar Alexander pushed for concrete suggestions for compromises.140
Senator Susan Collins of Maine answered the call, and was soon joined by two other Republican
Senators,  Lisa  Murkowski  of  Alaska  and  Kelly  Ayotte  of  New  Hampshire,  as  well  as  two
Democrats, Barbara Mikulski of Maryland and Patty Murray of Washington. The two Republicans
who joined with Collins were no strangers to attacks from the right: Ayotte had earlier been on the
receiving end of Senate Conservatives Fund ads about the Lee letter, while Murkowski had actually
been defeated in a 2010 primary election by a Tea Party candidate Joe Miller, who she then went on
to defeat as a write-in candidate141 in the general election142. The initial Collins proposal called for a
repeal of the medical device tax and tightened income verification rules for Obamacare subsidies in
exchange for reopening the government and funding it at current levels until November 15, when
broader formal budget negotiations would have to be started. The Senate Democrats were willing to
negotiate, but right from the start insisted on a delay of two years for the medical device tax rather
than a full repeal while demanding that government be funded at least until the end of January.
Despite these demands Mitch McConnell gave the Collins plan his backing.143
139 NYT 15.10.2013, Senate Near Fiscal Deal, but the House Is Uncertain.
140 WSJ 14.10.2013, Budget Battle: McConnell Rejoins the Fray as Negotiations Heat Up.
141 This was the first succesful Senate write-in campaign since Strom Thurmond's South Carolina write-in win in 1954.
In addition to having to run without the support of the party machine, a write-in candidate has to teach the electorate 
the proper spelling of his or her name (unlike a primary winner whose supporters only have to tick a box next to a 
name) as incorrectly spelled names are disqualified. Murkowski achieved this in part by running ads with the letters 
MUR next to pictures of a cow with the letter K stamped on it and a pair of skis. (The Washington Post 3.11.2010, 
In Alaska, fierce ballot-by-ballot count looms.)
142 Sabato 2011, 23–24.
143 NYT 14.10.2013, Spending Dispute Leaves A Senate Deal Elusive;
NYT 15.10.2013, Senate Women Lead in Effort To Find Accord.
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The news that a Senate deal was drawing near sent the House Republicans scurrying for a new
proposal of their own. If none was produced very soon, many members felt that they would be
forced to accept whatever deal came out of the Senate, and that the outcome then would most likely
be worse than a deal of their own making. Paul Ryan went as far as to complain publicly, to no
avail,  about  House  Republicans  being  ignored  by  the  negotiators  in  Senate144.  Adding  to  the
atmosphere of immediacy were the news on Tuesday, October 15 that the credit ratings agency
Fitch was putting the United States on "negative ratings watch", hinting at a repeat of an episode of
the 2011 fiscal crisis when Standard & Poor's downgraded America's credit rating145.146
With only two days to go before the nation would hit the debt ceiling, House Republicans spent
most of Tuesday hammering out the details of a bill they planned to vote on in the evening. The
core idea was to extend the debt ceiling until February 7 and fund the government until December
15. As for Obamacare, the House bill would have cut health insurance subsidies for members of
Congress, their staff and other administration personnel. But this was not enough for the defunders,
especially since Heritage Action publicly came out against the plan, and frantic attempts at nudging
the  bill  towards  their  preferences  caused the  more  moderate  House  Republicans  to  threaten  to
withdraw. Twice on Tuesday Boehner's team was about to put the bill to vote, only to withdraw it
moments later, because not enough support seemed forthcoming. In the end, they had to give up for
the day,  which effectively ensured that  a  solution would have to come from the Senate or not
happen at all.147
With no other credible options and little time to spare, Mitch McConnell and Harry Reid continued
with the negotiations from where Collins' group had left them. Democrats refused to budge over the
medical device tax, but otherwise a deal was in sight. McConnell said it gave the Republicans "far
less than many of us hoped for, quite frankly, but it's far better than what some had sought." What
he was referring to – and what was another sign of how bad the Republicans' negotiation position
had become – was the idea floated by some Democrats of demanding that the Republicans give up
some  of  the  budget  cuts  negotiated  in  2011  in  exchange  for  the  deal.  That  was  avoided,  but
otherwise there was not much in the deal for the Republicans. Obamacare would survive almost
without a scratch. For funding the government until January 15 and extending the debt ceiling until
144 NYT 15.10.2013, Senate Women Lead in Effort To Find Accord.
145 NYT 15.10.2013, Credit Agency Places U.S. on 'Ratings Watch'.
146 NYT 16.10.2013, With G.O.P. Badly Divided, Boehner Is Left 'Herding Cats'.
147 WSJ 16.10.2013, Conservative Dissent Stalls Budget Plan – House Leaders Forced to Cancel Vote; Fitch Warns 
U.S. Credit Rating at Risk;
NYT 16.10.2013, Talks In Disarray As House Balks Over Debt Plan.
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February 7 the Republicans would get a small tightening of the law's income verification rules. The
deal would also include mandatory budget talks in December.148
The only question that remained was whether the defunders would try to block the bill or delay it
over the October 17 debt ceiling deadline. Ted Cruz was faced by a torrent of questions by reporters
about whether he would use parliamentary tricks to do so in the Senate. He said he would not,
saying "there is nothing to be gained from delaying this vote one days or two days. The outcome
will be the same149". With Cruz admitting defeat, no other defunders moved in to block the vote.
It was 7:56 in the evening on October 16, when the final bill, called the Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2014, passed in the Senate on a vote of 81 for and 18 against. All the eighteen no-votes were
from Republican Senators, as were 27 of the yes-votes.150 The House vote for the bill ended at 10:18
with a final tally of 285 for and 144 against. All the no-votes were again from the Republicans,
while 87 of them voted yes. With three absences the bill was passed with a margin of 70 votes.151 As
President  Obama  had  already  signaled  that  he  would  sign  the  bill,  this  effectively  ended  the
government shutdown.
148 NYT 17.10.2013, Shutdown Is Over;
WSJ 18.10.2013, Deal or No Deal: Behind the Scenes, Silence, Distrust And Hardball.
149 The New York Times video of Ted Cruz saying he won't block the deal ending the shutdown, 16.10.2013.
150 Senate Roll Call vote 219.
151 House of Representatives Roll Call vote 550.
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3. Explaining the divisions
"All that really matters is what my district wants. And my district is overwhelmingly in favor of my
position."
Representative Thomas Massie, on why he supports defunding Obamacare even if it leads to shutdown.152
The bare-bones narrative of the shutdown from the Republicans' perspective is clear, then: looking
for new ways to attack Obamacare and urged by conservatives such as Cruz, Lee and Meadows, the
Republicans settled on a tactic of threatening to shut down the government if  the law was not
defunded or at least delayed by a year. In the late summer 14 of 46 Republican Senators and 80 out
of 232 Representatives signed the Lee and Meadows letters. This approach led to the shutdown,
which did not end in the Democrats' capitulation, as the defunders had hoped, but rather in their
own. After sixteen days 87 Representatives and 27 Senators voted in favor of the bill that ended the
shutdown, while 144 Representatives and 18 Senators did not. 
In the Senate 24 members supported the final compromise and had declined to sign the Lee letter,
while 10 Senators had signed the letter and voted no, whereas further 10 others either voted no but
had declined  to  sign,  or  had  signed but  voted  yes153.  In  the  House 78  members  voted  for  the
compromise and had declined to sign the Meadows letter, while 72 voted against the compromise
and had signed the letter, whereas another 81 members either voted for the compromise, but had
signed the letter, or voted against the compromise, but had not signed the letter.154
But is this all there is to it? Why did some Republicans support the defunding strategy while others
did not? The obvious answer is that those who agreed with the letters or the final compromise
supported them and those who did not  declined.  While  this  is  a  naive approach,  it  hints  at  an
important warning: researchers should not presume to be able to answer definitely why politicians
act as they do. Decisions such as whether to vote for the reopening of the government or not are
influenced  by numerous  and  various  factors,  the  majority  of  which  are  beyond  the  access  of
researchers. Some politicians may voice out their rationales, but even then there are no guarantees
to the veracity of their claims. In short, achieving definite and final understanding of politicians'
motives is impossible.
152 The Washington Post 18.9.2013, The Morning Plum: Are Dems turning on Obama? Yes. Does it matter? Not much.
153 Senator Inhofe, who signed the Lee letter, but was absent from the vote is again excluded from the count, as is 
Representative C.W. Bill Young, who did not sign the Meadows letter.
154 A full rundown of who voted for what and signed what letters is available in the Appendix at the end of this thesis.
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This is not to say that nothing can be learned, however. There were 358 Congressional Republicans
involved in the broader government shutdown battle of 2013. A closer look at their signatures in the
letters and votes in Congress does reveal patterns and these patterns are important. As long as no
deterministic  power  is  assigned  to  these  patterns,  they  can  help  us  better  understand  the
Congressional Republican caucus and the divisions inside it.
One good example of looking for these patterns is an article in the New Yorker by Ryan Lizza 155,
where drawing on the work of Cook Political Report's analyst David Wasserman, he looks at the
geographical dispersion of the signatories of the Meadows letter, as well a few other variables such
as  the  racial  composition  of  the  voters  in  their  districts.  A full  half  of  the  signatories  for  the
Meadows letter hail from Southern states and quarter from Midwestern states, whereas the racial
composition of an average signatory district is 75% white. Such analysis is useful indeed, but more
is needed.156
These  are  then  the  questions  to  which  answers  are  sought  next:  did  the  different  factions  that
emerged during the shutdown differ in seniority? Did the Republicans with experience of earlier
shutdowns behave differently in 2013 than those who had no such experience? What was the role of
the Tea Party?  What  about  ideology in a broader  sense? And finally,  were there differences in
behavior between members of Congress from safe districts and in states that lean reliably towards
the Republicans on the one hand and members in swing states and in heavily contested districts on
the other?
155 While Lizza's article is illuminating in its analysis of the signatories of the Meadows letter, it does also underline by
many of its word choices why studying the variables behind the behaviour of politicians should not be left solely to 
journalists. A telling example is Lizza's choice, perhaps channeling Devin Nunes, of calling the signatories of the 
Meadows letter the "suicide caucus".
156 The New Yorker, Where the G.O.P's Suicide Caucus Lives.
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3.1. Seniority and experience of previous shutdowns
"One of my favorite old Kentucky sayings is there's no education in the second kick of a mule. The
first kick of a mule was when we shut the government down in the mid-1990s and the second kick
was over the last 16 days."
Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, dismissing the idea of future shutdowns.157
John Boehner had recently ascended to the position of Chairman of the Republican Conference
Committee, the fourth-highest post in the House leadership, when the Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich led the party into the twin government shutdowns of 1995 and 1996. Those shutdowns,
just like the one in 2013, were calamitous for the Republicans. They started a downward spiral in
Gingrich's fortunes – and by extension those of Boehner, who was linked to Gingrich by the virtue
of his title. Gingrich stepped down after an electoral defeat in the 1998 midterms; Boehner was
ousted in a private-ballot vote soon after and replaced J.C. Watts. That the man who was so central
to  the  2013  government  shutdown  suffered  the  biggest  political  defeat  of  his  career  due  to
circumstances  closely linked to  the  previous  two shutdowns is  remarkable.  It  must  have  given
Boehner quite the perspective in 2013.158
He was not alone in this. There were 14 Senators and 36 members of the House who had been in
Congress at the time of the Clinton-era shutdowns. Some had already been in politics during the
earlier  shutdowns: 8 Senators and 13 members of the House had witnessed some or all  of the
Reagan-era shutdowns, while 4 Senators and 4 members of the House had participated in pre-
Civiletti shutdowns during Jimmy Carter's presidency.159
Four veteran lawmakers have actually been involved in all the government shutdowns in the history
of the United States. These are Congressman Don Young of Alaska, Congressman C.W. Bill Young
of Florida, Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi and Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa. Neither
Cochran  nor  Don  Young  had  signed  the  Lee  or  Meadows  letter,  and  they  both  voted  for  the
157 The Hill 17.10.2013, GOP's McConnell promises no more shutdowns over ObamaCare.
158 Grant 2004, 53;
Politico Magazine Jan/Feb 2015, The Prisoner of Capitol Hill;
The Washington Post Magazine 19.5.2011, Is the biggest threat to Speaker of the House John Boehner the 'Young 
Guns' in his own party?
159 A detailed list of the members' seniority is included in the Appendix at the end of this thesis. Since members of 
Congress are sworn in in the beginning of January, and since the 2013 shutdown occured only two and a half months
before the end of the year, the career-length numbers in here and in the Appendix are rounded up to the next full 
year. The information about the career-lenghts of the politicians used throughout this sub-chapter are from:
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774 – present.
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compromise to reopen government.  Grassley on the other hand had signed the letter  and voted
against the final compromise. C.W. Bill Young had not signed the letter, but was absent during the
final vote and died two days later.
There was yet one lawmaker whose career was arguably more influenced by government shutdowns
than even the four veterans of all the shutdowns. This was Representative Steve Stockman of Texas
– best known nationally for his "If babies had guns they wouldn't be aborted" campaign bumper
stickers – who first joined the House just in time for the Clinton-era shutdowns and lost his seat to a
Democrat in the ensuing backlash. Stockman then tried several times to get back to Congress, only
to succeed in 2012, just in time for the 2013 shutdown. Following the reopening of government
Stockman announced that he would give up his seat in the House to try to capture Texas Senator
John Cornyn's seat. A large part of Stockman's rationale for risking his seat in the House was that
Cornyn had taken too soft a stance during the shutdown had thus had to go. Cornyn was later re-
elected.160
The veterans of earlier shutdowns were divided over the 2013 shutdown. Nine veteran Senators
voted in favor of reopening the government, while four opposed it. In the House 18 members voted
for the compromise and 17 voted against it. On the side of the "no" vote, three Senators had signed
the Lee letter, while 7 Representatives had signed the Meadows letter. Only Representative Howard
Coble of North Carolina had signed the Meadows letter and still voted for the final compromise,
though  Senator  Roger  Wicker  of  Mississippi  had  initially  supported  the  Lee  letter  before
withdrawing his signature.
Despite the fact that the veterans of earlier shutdowns were not united in their approach to the 2013
shutdown, they were still more likely to support the final compromise to reopen government than
those members that did not have experience of earlier shutdowns. In the House of Representatives
about 51% of the veterans voted in favor of the compromise and 49% against it, while those without
shutdown experience split their vote 35% in favor and 65% against. In the Senate,  70% of the
veterans supported the bill and 30% opposed it, while those without shutdown experience voted
56% in favor and 44% against the bill.
Looking at the divisions in the signatures and the final vote also reveals differences in seniority
among Congressional Republicans. The average time spent in Congress at the end of 2013 was 15.3
160 Politico Magazine 20.12.2013, Steve Stockman Can't Lose.
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years for the Senators who voted for the final compromise, 12.6 years for those who voted against
it, 10.2 years for Representatives who voted for it and 8.1 years for those Representatives who did
not. On average then, the supporters of the compromise had over two years of seniority compared to
those who opposed the bill. There is a similar pattern in regards to the defunding letters. Signatories
had served on average 12 years in the Senate and 7.1 years in the House, while those who declined
to sign had at the end of 2013 had a career of 16.1 years in the Senate and 9.8 years in the House on
average.
An aggressive political stance towards defunding Obamacare and the government shutdown that
ensued can  therefore  be  said  to  correlate  inversely with  members'  seniority.  It  is  not  the  only
attribute that behaves like that: another is the next factor to be considered – affiliation with the Tea
Party movement161.
161 Gervais & Morris 2015, 21.
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3.2. The role of the Tea Party
"It's exactly what we wanted, and we got it."
Representative Michele Bachmann, on the adoption of the defunding strategy.162
So was Nancy Pelosi right? Was the 2013 government shutdown a "Tea Party shutdown"? That the
shutdown happened over a law that was and is anathema to the movement is not in itself enough to
justify Pelosi's sentiment, as the Tea Party does not have a Republican monopoly over hatred of
Obamacare. On the other hand, the events that led to the shutdown were in many respects put in
motion by three central  Tea Party politicians Meadows, Lee and Cruz.  Likewise the grassroots
activists did have an important part in drumming up support for the defunding strategy, as did many
conservative  advocacy organizations  like  Heritage  Foundation  and FreedomWorks  that  have  in
recent years been closely associated with the Tea Party movement. But what of the Tea Partiers in
Congress?
For one thing they voted overwhelmingly against the bill to reopen government. In the House only
eight out of sixty-six Tea Partiers voted yes in the final vote. The Meadows letter too was well
received by Tea Party affiliated Representatives: 48 members had signed the letter, while 18 had
not. Six of those who declined voted for the final compromise. The House Tea Partiers as a whole
can therefore be said to have adopted a more aggressive shutdown stance than their compatriots.
Meanwhile in the Senate, the only high-profile Tea Party supporter to not to sign the Lee letter and
not to vote against the compromise was Jerry Moran of Kansas.
Still, besides ushering in the defunding strategy and opposing the final compromise that ended it,
the Tea Party members of Congress could do very little once it became clear that the Democrats did
not cave in under the threat of a shutdown. Valiantly the politicians and the grassroots activists both
kept  to  their  talking  points.  The Tea  Party Patriots  had  in  September  produced a  guide  called
Defunding Obamacare Toolkit for Activists, which had a section with possible responses to media
about the shutdown. One question read "What happens when you shut down the government and
you are blamed for it?", for which one of the three premade answers was "If Congress is willing to
defund this terrible law and stand up for the American people, the American people will support
them".163 But no reprise of the mobilization that followed Santelli's Tea Party launching 2009 rant
162 The Washington Post 28.9.2013, On cusp of shutdown, House conservatives excited, say they are doing the right 
thing.
163 Tea Party Patriots 2013, 11.
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happened.
The sole exception, limited in scale as though it was, was an event in Washington DC on October
13 called the Million Vet March on the Memorials164. The image of elderly war veterans trying and
failing to access war memorials closed by the shutdown had given the Republicans some of their
best shutdown related PR victories already on the first day of the crisis. On that occasion a handful
of Republicans, including Tea Partiers such as Louie Gohmert of Texas and Michele Bachmann, had
rushed to the scene and helped the veterans to access the memorials. The Million Vet March was an
attempt to capitalize on that image.165
The  four-hour  long  Million  Vet  March  drew  in  thousands  of  protestors  and  featured  several
speeches by Tea Party politicians. Ted Cruz, Mike Lee, Steve Stockman and Sarah Palin all spoke
and criticized the shutting down of the memorials. "Our veterans should be above politics," Cruz
said  and pointed  out  that  the Republicans  had tried  to  open the monuments  as  a  part  of  their
piecemeal  approach,  which  had been blocked by the  Democrats.  While  the  participants  of  the
Million Vet March were passionate enough – some barricades were damaged and deposed at the
White  House  gates  –  one  march  in  Washington  DC  was  hardly  the  popular  uprising  against
Obamacare that the Tea Partiers had hoped for.166
In the final  analysis  then,  there is  some truth  to  Pelosi's  statement.  Though there  is  danger  in
speculation, it could be argued that the 2013 government shutdown might not have happened were
it not for the Tea Party. Tea Party affiliated politicians, Cruz, Lee and Meadows in particular, were
central proponents of the defunding strategy. Also, the pressure put on Speaker Boehner's leadership
team from 2010 to 2013 by the Tea Partiers  in  the House must  have contributed to  Boehner's
decision to not to seek a "clean" Continuing Resolution at the eve of the shutdown. On the other
hand, it is important to note that while the Tea Partiers might have had an important role in ushering
in the shutdown, once it started they had very little control over the events leading up to the final
compromise and Republican surrender. Thus the shutdown can neither be understood without the
Tea Party, nor by looking at it alone.
164 The Million Vet March website.
165 NYT 1.10.2013, After Being Denied Access, Veterans' Group Allowed to Tour Memorial.
166 CNN 13.10.2013, Rallier tells Obama to 'put the Quran down';
CBS DC 13.10.2013, 'Million Vet March' Storms D.C. Memorials.
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3.3. The role of ideology
"Because we're right, simply because we're right. We can recover from a political squabble, but we
can never recover from Obamacare."
Representative Steve King, on the rationale for the shutdown.167
It  is  also  worthwhile  to  consider  more  broadly  the  impact  of  ideology  on  the  behavior  of
Congressional Republicans during the 2013 government shutdown. There are several useful ways to
assess  and  compare  members'  ideology.  Among  the  most  popular  ones  is  DW-NOMINATE,  a
method created by political scientists Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. The mechanics behind
the  method are  very complex,  but  the  underlying  assumption  that  produces  the  results  is  easy
enough to understand: the methodology assumes that the most liberal member of Congress votes
most  often  like  the  second-most  liberal  member,  second-most  often  with  the  third-most  liberal
member and so forth. The same of course goes for conservatives. The score produced by DW-
NOMINATE ranges from the liberal maximum of -1.0 to moderate 0.0 and to the conservative
maximum of  1.0.  The  ideological  drift  over  time  of  consecutive  Congresses  means  that  DW-
NOMINATE scores should probably not be compared over time, but for assessing the ideology of a
single Congress,  like the 113th,  it  is  a  powerful  tool.  All  the Common Space DW-NOMINATE
scores used in this thesis are from the voteview.com website that is run by Keith T. Poole168.169
The assignment  of numerical  values to  how members of Congress  vote is  also popular  among
various pressure groups and advocacy organizations, especially on the conservative side. Among the
more influential scorekeepers is Heritage Action, Heritage Foundation's political arm, which was
very active in promoting and supporting the strategy of defunding Obamacare through 2013. Unlike
DW-NOMINATE, which forms its score from all the votes cast in Congress, the Heritage Action
scorecard  is  updated  based on the  members'  votes  and co-sponsorship  of  bills  in  selected  key
conservative policy areas. The scores range from the liberal extreme of 0% to the conservative
extreme of 100%. All the Heritage Action scorecard values used in this thesis are from the Heritage
Action scorecard website170.171
When it comes to the vote for the bill that ended the 2013 government shutdown, the hardliners
167 NYT 1.10.2013, Conservatives With a Cause: 'We're Right'.
168 The voteview.com website.
169 Trende 2012, xxx–xxxi.
170 Heritage Action Scorecard page.
171 Heritage Action Scorecard methology page.
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were, unsurprisingly, significantly more conservative in general than those Republicans that voted
for the bill.  The yes-votes in the House had an average Heritage Action score of 47.9% and an
average DW-NOMINATE score of 0.397, whereas the no-voters had an average Heritage Action
score of 70% and an average DW-NOMINATE score of 0.601. The results in the Senate are similar.
Those who voted for the bill had an average Heritage Action score of 50.8% and an average DW-
NOMINATE score of 0.397, while those who voted against the bill had an average Heritage Action
score of 80.7% and an average DW-NOMINATE score of 0.628.
Despite the fact that the House Republicans who voted against the reopening the government can be
said to be significantly more conservative than those who voted for it, the 144 no-voters should not
be  thought  as  a  totally homogenous block.  There  were,  in  fact,  included in  that  count  several
Representatives who had not signed the Meadows letter and who had moderate scores according to
the DW-NOMINATE scale and the Heritage Action scoreboard both. There were, for example, 18
such Representatives who had a DW-NOMINATE score lower than 0.500 and a Heritage Action
score lower than 70%. Ideologically these politicians have therefore more in common with the
Republicans who voted for the final compromise than with those who voted against it. There could
be  many explanations  for  such behavior.  Perhaps  these  members  were  trying  to  bulk  up  their
conservative credentials? The flipside of such an argument, of course, would be that the "real" fire-
in-their-belly  defunders  are  even  more  conservative  than  the  above  average  ideology  scores
indicate.
As  for  the  Tea  Party,  since  the  movement's  grassroots  activists  really  are  significantly  more
conservative than today's "mainstream" Republican supporters, it comes as no surprise that the Tea
Party  politicians  in  Congress  represent  the  most  conservative  wing  of  the  party,  even  when
compared to all  the members that voted against the bill  to reopen government.  The House Tea
Partiers had an average Heritage Action score of 73.6% and an average DW-NOMINATE score of
0.631.
Conversely, the 25 Representatives who during the shutdown publicly supported the passing of a
"clean" Continuing Resolution were some of  the most  moderate  or  centrist  Republicans  in  the
party's caucus. Their average Heritage Action score was 45.6% and their average DW-NOMINATE
score was 0.343.  Charlie  Dent,  for  instance,  is  the thirteenth-most  moderate  Republican in  the
House when measured by DW-NOMINATE. Looking in the same way at some of the other very
vocal critics of the defunding strategy reveals that Michael Grimm of New York is the fourth-most
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moderate House Republican, while Peter T. King from the same state ranks at number eighteen.
Devin Nunes, the California Republican who delighted reporters by his "lemmings with suicide
vests" analogy only ranks at number 107. In fact, Nunes was one of the five Representatives who
walked back from comments supporting a "clean" Continuing Resolution172.
In  a  similar  vein,  of  the three  Republican  Senators  who created the  blueprint  for  the  eventual
compromise, especially Susan Collins and Lisa Murkowski have very centrist voting records when
compared to many of their colleagues. The DW-NOMINATE and Heritage Action scores of Collins,
Murkowski  and  Kelly  Ayotte  are  0.088  and  22%,  0.192  and  23% as  well  as  0.368  and  48%
respectively.  This actually makes Collins  the most  moderate  Republican Senator  in the Senate,
while Murkowski takes the second place and Ayotte comes in ninth.
These results are mirrored by the ideology scores of the leading defunders. Mike Lee was the most
conservative Senator of the 113th Senate on both counts, while Ted Cruz came in second according
to the Heritage Action scorecard and fourth according to DW-NOMINATE.
Overall these ideology scores prove that there were no significant departures from prior behavior by
the  members  of  Congress  during  the  2013  government  shutdown.  The  more  conservative  a
Republican was, the more likely he or she was to adopt an aggressive stance in regards to the
shutdown. That the defunding cause was led by the most conservative Senator of them all, while the
compromise that ended the showdown was engineered by the most moderate one can hardly be a
coincidence.
Ideology is not the only factor influencing the behavior of politicians however. There are political
realities that must be taken into account, and chief among them is how voters back home might
react to choices made in Washington. These reactions – and the two different kinds of elections in
which they manifest – must next be looked at.
172 The Huffington Post 1.10.2013, Here's A Tally Of Which House Republicans Are Ready To Fund The Government, 
No Strings Attached.
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3.4. The role of district safety for incumbents
"My job is to beat him. And if we don't, I don't know how he wins in November when he's divided
his own party as much as he has."
Mitch McConnell's primary challenger Matt Bevin, on their contest.173
The shutdown conundrum faced by Mitch McConnell in 2013 is emblematic of the kind of a choice
that many Congressional Republicans have increasingly had to make: McConnell had to choose
which he feared the most, attacks from the left in the general election or attacks from the right
during the primary election. Both were surely coming in 2014 and many of those attacks were sure
to cite his actions during the shutdown. Though McConnell has not articulated his motives, his
central role in negotiating the Republicans' surrender at least indicates that if he was in fact afraid of
Matt Bevin, he did not let that fear dictate his actions.
Not  all  Congressional  Republicans  can  afford  to  be  so  brazen.  The  ever-advancing  political
polarization of American politics coupled with the prevalence of highly gerrymandered districts
means that for many members of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, McConnell's conundrum is no
conundrum at all: for them the only real challengers only ever emerge in primary elections. The rise
of the Tea Party and its quest for ideological purging of the Republican party has made the political
choices associated with this phenomenon especially pertinent for Republican officeholders.
There are many ways of assessing the degree to which Congressional districts favor one party or the
other.  One  of  the  most  popular,  and  the  one  used  in  this  thesis,  is  the  Partisan  Voting  Index
popularized by Charlie Cook. The Partisan Voting Index is calculated by comparing a district's
average of vote split from the two latest presidential elections to the nation's average vote split in
the same two elections. McConnell's home state Kentucky, for example, had a Partisan Voting Index
of  R+13  in  2014,  meaning  that  the  state  has  a  very  Republican  leaning  and  voted  thirteen
percentage points more in favor of the Republicans than Americans on average. Partisan Voting
Index can also be calculated for all the House districts of the 113 th Congress. John Boehner's Ohio
district  for instance has a Partisan Voting Index of R+15. Members in districts  as favorable to
Republicans as that of Boehner can reasonably be thought to also be those where the danger of a
primary challenger is more serious than that posed by a general election opponent of the other party.
All the Partisan Voting Index values used in this thesis are from the Cook Political Report's Partisan
173 ABC News 20.5.2014, McConnell Challenger Says Nasty Primary Could Result in November Loss.
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Voting Index state by state174 and district by district lists175.
In the House the members who voted for the October 16 compromise were from districts that had
an average Partisan Voting Index of R+7.7. For those who voted against the measure the average
value was R+13.1. This is not very surprising. It means that the opponents of the bill that ended the
shutdown came from districts where the constituents leaned 5.4 percentage points more towards the
Republicans than in the districts that were represented by Republicans who supported the final
compromise.  It  not  an  unreasonable  assumption  that  such  districts  might  more  easily  produce
primary challengers armed with accusations about softness during the shutdown. And since it is
almost inconceivable that a Democrat might win such a district, adopting a strict stance during the
shutdown has no real electoral disadvantages.
The 25 public supporters of a "clean" Continuing Resolution on the other hand had an average
Partisan Voting Index of only R+4.3. In such districts a hard line during the shutdown might be
construed as dangerous brinkmanship and thus carry a real political penalty. In fact, eight of the
twenty-five supporters of a "clean" Continuing Resolution came from districts that had actually
given more votes to President Obama than Mitt Romney.
In  the  Senate  the  supporters  of  the  final  compromise  came from states  that  had  favored  Mitt
Romney and John McCain by 7.7 percentage points more than Americans on average, while the
Partisan Voting Index of the deal's opponents was on average R+10.4. While it is true that Senators
only have to worry about primary challengers every six years as opposed to members of the House
of Representatives whose bi-annual elections ensure that the danger is constant, Lisa Murkowski's
2010 experience in Alaska alone proves that such worries are not always baseless. Incidentally,
Alaska's Partisan Voting Index is R+12 – a comfortable margin, but still a far cry from the likes of
Mike Lee's Utah, where the number stands at R+22.
For  a  Republican  incumbent,  the  safety  of  his  or  her  district  can  then  be  said  to  have  some
explanatory power in regards to the 2013 government shutdown, especially on the side of the House
of Representatives. Such safety can be thought to isolate the politicians from lasting damage in the
inevitable aftermath that follows political confrontations as dramatic as the 2013 shutdown.
174 The Cook Political Report 2014.
175 The Cook Political Report 2013.
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4. The aftermath and consequences of the shutdown
"This has been a very bad two weeks for the Republican brand. For the party, this is a moment of
self-evaluation. Either we are going to assess how we got here and try to self-correct, or, if we
continue down this path, we are really going to hurt the Republican Party long term."
Senator Lindsey Graham, on the shutdown's effect on the Republican Party.176
As the furloughed federal employees reported back to work on Thursday morning of October 17,
the blame game was already in full swing. The shutdown strategy had failed, and now the focus of
the power struggles among Congressional Republicans shifted to determining who would get to
define why the loss occurred and what  it  should mean for the future.  Former Senator  and the
President of the Heritage Foundation Jim DeMint set the tone for these debates with his October 18
op-ed in the Wall Street Journal titled "We Won't Back Down on ObamaCare", where he sought to
pre-empt criticism by explaining his organization's role in promoting the defunding strategy and to
debunk the idea that the results of the 2012 presidential elections meant that Republicans should
stop opposing the healthcare law. DeMint pledged to keep on fighting and extolled "the courageous
leadership of people like Sens. Ted Cruz and Mike Lee".177 Many other Republicans also scrambled
to get out their views. The crisis was dramatic enough to make some kind of political fallout likely,
but as the last shutdown was seventeen years in the past, nobody could be quite sure about what the
ramifications of the crisis would end up having this time around.
Some of the immediate consequences of the shutdown for Republicans were quite obvious. For
example, the special election that was held in New Jersey on October 16 to fill the Senate seat of the
Democrat Frank Lautenberg, who had died in June, was reframed by the media and both parties as a
wider referendum on the shutdown. Following the death of Lautenberg, the Republican Governor
Chris Christie had appointed Jeff Chiesa to fill the empty seat until the special  election.  In the
Senate, Chiesa had been ideologically the most liberal Republican Senator to sign the Lee letter
(DW-NOMINATE: 0.251; Heritage Action score 32%), but he also voted in favor of ending the
shutdown  on  the  very  day  of  the  special  election.  Running  to  replace  Chiesa  were  a  rising
Democratic star and two-term Mayor of Newark Cory Booker and a former Republican Mayor of
Bogota Steve Lonegan.178
176 WSJ 17.10.2013, Congress Passes a Debt Bill – White House Tells Furloughed Employees to Return to Work 
Thursday; Treasury Default Is Staved Off.
177 WSJ 18.10.2013, We Won't Back Down on ObamaCare.
178 WSJ 16.10.2013, Booker's Lead Narrows at End of New Jersey Senate Race;
CNN 16.10.2013, Shutdown key issue in special Senate election.
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Booker attacked Lonegan repeatedly for his public support of the shutdown strategy. The race ended
in a resounding 11% margin victory for Booker. Lonegan, however, was of the opinion that victory
had been possible before the shutdown, and that he had had enormous momentum on his side.
"There is no doubt in my mind or in the minds of any of my campaign staff that the shutdown cost
me the election," Lonegan said afterwards, citing promising internal polling numbers.  Lonegan also
criticized strongly the shutdown strategy, which he apparently had earlier supported publicly only
out of party loyalty. The wide margin of Booker's victory casts doubt on Lonegan's claims, but it is
true that the special election really did become a referendum on the shutdown, in the media at least,
and that  some of  public  polling  showing Booker  leading with  a  large  margin  even before  the
shutdown did have a larger than usual margin of error due to the race being a special election with a
high probability of a very low voter turnout. It can be argued, then, that whatever chances Lonegan
had were ruined by the shutdown. It is possible imagine a contra-factual situation where instead of
Lonegan being tied to the shutdown, Booker would in its absence have been associated with the
problematic rollout of the healthcare reform.179
The shutdown also seems to have had an impact on the Virginian gubernatorial race, which saw
much  of  the  campaigning  for  the  November  5  election  happen  during  the  shutdown  and  its
immediate aftermath. Due to a state law prohibiting Governors from serving consecutive terms,
neither  the  Republican  candidate  and  Attorney  General  Ken  Cuccinelli  nor  the  Democratic
candidate  and  former  Democratic  National  Committee  Chairman  Terry  McAuliffe  ran  as  the
incumbent. Early polling conducted in the summer showed a tight race with McAuliffe having a
small lead, which, following a short-lived September spike, then expanded to a confortable lead
during  and  after  the  shutdown180.  The  Christopher  Newport  University  undertook  polling  on
October  8–13,  in  which  the  respondents  were  asked  if  they  blamed  either  candidate  for  the
shutdown, and if so, which one. The share of people blaming either candidate was only 13%, but
out of those who named responsible parties 47% put the blame on Cuccinelli, compared to 7% for
McAuliffe.181 It is uncertain if the shutdown alone explains the fact that Cuccinelli, who sought to
disassociate himself from the crisis, ended up losing the race, but the result was only a narrow
victory of 2.5% for McAuliffe182, and many Republican operators certainly think the shutdown hurt
179 WSJ 15.10.2013, Turning out New Jersey – Booker, Lonegan in Final Push to Get Voters to Polls for Senate Special
Election;
Nj.com 15.10.2013, Cory Booker: A vote for Lonegan is a vote for shutdown;
Nj.com 21.10.2013, Lonegan: The government shutdown cost me the election.
180 RealClearPolitics polling averages page for the 2013 Virginia gubernatorial race.
181 CNN 15.10.2013, Poll: Shutdown affecting race for Virginia governor.
182 Virginia Department of Elections results page for the 2013 gubernatorial election.
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the Republican chances in the race183.
There is danger, however, in overtly simplistic explanations where subsequent events are explained
solely or even mostly by the shutdown. The sixteen-day long crisis was an important, dramatic and
even historic period of time, and significant political and electoral impacts did certainly follow in its
wake. These alterations to the political climate did not happen in a vaccum, however, and thus in the
final analysis it is impossible to separate these impacts from other relevant factors. This difficulty
becomes even more pronounced when looking at  events that took place not days or weeks but
months and years after the shutdown. One may speak of the shutdown's aftermath, but defining
exactly when it ended is essentially impossible. This does not mean that the shutdown's aftermath
should not be studied – only that a certain degree of uncertainty must again be embraced.
What  follows,  then,  is  a  look  at  how the  shutdown affected  the  balance  of  power  within  the
Congressional  Republican caucus.  In  seeking to determine who were the winners and who the
losers  of  the  shutdown,  emphasis  is  put  on  the  first  few weeks  after  the  shutdown and  those
politicians who due to their positions in the party as well as their actions were most visible in the
national media coverage of the crisis. The effects of the shutdown kept on reverberating beyond
2013, however, and in several instances it is necessary venture as far into the future as 2015 whilst
keeping in mind the inescapable methodological problems mentioned above.
183 NYT 3.10.2013, Fallout for G.O.P. Candidate Where Shutdown Pain Is Acute.
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4.1. The shutdown's effect on the Republican Congressional leadership
"All the rock throwers have come to the conclusion that he's got a really hard job; that's what the
shutdown did for John. [...] But now I think there's a decent chance some of these people, especially
the new ones, are going to give him the support he needs."
Representative Mike Rogers, on the shutdown's effect on Boehner's leadership.184
For  sixteen  days  the  Republican  Congressional  leaders  had  been  engaged  in  a  very  difficult
balancing act, trying to manage the public opinion all the while negotiating with the Democrats and
trying to keep the various factions within their own ranks from staging coups or rebellions. Insofar
the  period  covering  the  shutdown itself  is  concerned,  they  were  largely  successful.  They also
remained largely united amongst themselves, despite the fact that there were at times competing
negotiations between the White House and the House of Representatives on the one hand, and the
White House and the Senate on the other. Speaker Boehner, Minority Leader McConnell, House
Majority Leader Cantor and House Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy of California all voted in favor
of the final compromise. In fact, the only high-profile Republican outside the defunders themselves
to vote against the measure was Paul Ryan, who opposed the deal because it did not do enough to
address the country's structural deficit. "We're just kicking the can down the road," Ryan said.185
Boehner himself, who throughout his tenure as Speaker had had a stormy relationship with many of
the younger and more aggressive Tea Party orientated members of his caucus, probably solidified
his position after the shutdown, at least for a while. When he gathered his caucus together as the
Senate  set  out  to  vote  for  the  final  compromise  he  was  met  by  a  standing  ovation  from his
colleagues. Though the deal had been fiercely opposed by many House Republicans any ideas of
revenge  on  Boehner  were  quickly dispelled.  "There  is  absolutely no  talk"  of  ousting  Boehner
assured Jim Jordan of Ohio, a very conservative Tea Party defunder.186
Several other hardliners were equally quick to praise Boehner. Representative Raúl Labrador of
Idaho, who had been one of twelve187 House Republicans who did not vote for Boehner in a January
184 Politico Magazine Jan/Feb 2015, The Prisoner of Capitol Hill.
185 WSJ 17.10.2013, Congress Passes Debt Bill – White House Tells Furloughed Employees to Return to Work 
Thursday; Treasury Default Is Staved Off.
186 WSJ 17.10.2013, Budget Battle: House Conservatives Gird for Next Fights;
WSJ 17.10.2013, Congress Passes Debt Bill – White House Tells Furloughed Employees to Return to Work 
Thursday; Treasury Default Is Staved Off.
187 The following Republicans did not vote for Boehner in 2013: Jim Bridestine of Oklahoma, Steve Peace of New 
Mexico, Ted Yoho of Florida, Paul Broun of Georgia, Louie Gohmert of Texas, Justin Amash of Michigan, Tim 
Huelskamp of Kansas, Walter Jones of North Carolina, Tom Massie of Kentucky, Steve Stockman of Texas, Raúl 
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leadership vote, said he was "really proud" of Boehner's handling of the crisis, and then added "I'm
more upset with my Republican conference, to be honest with you188." The fact that Boehner had
accommodated the defunders against his personal political instincts was not lost to or unappreciated
by the defunders. Representative John Fleming of Louisiana said "We know he tends not to want to
pursue tough battles. I think he's migrated towards us. We are appriciative of that."189
While the gratitude of the defunders might have made Boehner's job easier – for a while at least –
he was not equally impressed with their  efforts  during the shutdown. Boehner made his views
explicit  in  December  during  one  of  his  weekly  legislative  press  briefings.  Tea  Party affiliated
outside groups had just attacked the modest results of a deal made by Paul Ryan and his Democratic
counterpart  Senator  Patty  Murray  in  the  budget  talks  mandated  by  the  shutdown-ending  deal.
Boehner, who in his own words does not "do anger"190, did not have many kind words in response to
these criticisms.191
The whole nine minutes long briefing is very interesting, but the portion about the shutdown is
especially illuminating and worth quoting here in its entirety:
Question: Some of these [Tea Party aligned outside] groups are "using your members, using
the American people." What do you mean by that? 
Boehner: Well, frankly, I think they are misleading their followers. I think they are pushing 
our members in places where they don't want to be. And frankly, I just think that they have 
lost all credibility. You know, when they pushed us into this fight to defund Obamacare and 
to shut down the government. Most of you know, my members know, that wasn't exactly the 
strategy I had in mind. But if you recall, the day before the government reopend, one of the 
people,  one of  these groups stood up and said "well  we never  really  thought  it  would  
work..." – ARE YOU KIDDING ME??192
As angry as Boehner may still have been at the defunders, the fact remains that he managed to
navigate  the  cross-pressures  of  the  shutdown very well.  Under  intense  media  scrutiny,  he  had
Labrador of Idaho and Rick Mulvaney of South Carolina.(The Washington Post 3.1.2013, Who voted against 
Boehner for speaker and why?)
188 NYT 17.10.2013, Shutdown Is Over.
189 NYT 17.10.2013, Hands Empty but Spirit Unbowed, House Republicans Take Stock.
190 Politico Magazine Jan/Feb 2015, The Prisoner of Capitol Hill.
191 NPR 12.12.2013, Boehner Blasts Tea Party Groups Over Budget Deal Criticism.
192 C-SPAN video of Boehner's weekly legislative briefing, 12.12.2013.
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contributed  to  keeping  the  different  factions  of  the  Republican  caucus  from  staging  outright
rebellions  or letting the country default.  The fact  that  Boehner  managed to do all  this  without
coming close to losing his job as the Speaker is even more remarkable. His personal favorability
rating did fall to 27% as a result of the shutdown, but it can be argued that this was inevitable for
somebody in his position, and in any case, his favourability rating did rise back to its pre-shutdown
level of 31% by April, 2014193. The visible end result for him, then, was temporary breathing space
from the kinds of challenges from his own members to his leadership that had come to characterize
his reign as Speaker. In retrospect, though, for Boeher, both this post-shutdown calm period and his
remaining time as Speaker would end up being shorter than many expected.
The Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, on the other hand, emerged from the shutdown with
his political fortunes and political capital both largely unchanged. While many Republicans in the
House  griped  publicly  about  the  Senate's  "surrender",  no  such  criticism  was  heard  from  his
colleagues in the Senate. McConnell's junior colleague and Tea Party darling Kentucky Senator
Rand Paul, who had been an early proponent of the shutdown strategy, even went on record to
defend McConnell's handing of the negotiations, saying that "in a difficult situation, he did a good
job of trying to get the government open again," and adding that Kentucky was "fortunate to have
Senator McConnell as a leader up there194."
As expected, McConnell's re-election campaign in Kentucky itself featured several attacks over his
role in the government shutdown. His Republican primary challenger Matt Bevin had initially been
a vocal supporter of the defunding strategy, calling McConnell's September reluctance to support
the defunders a "total surrender" and saying it showed him as being "unfit to lead". Two days after
the shutdown ended, the Senate Conservatives Fund piled on, giving Bevin their endorsement and
support195.  As  the  race  went  on,  however,  Bevin  performed  a  curious  turnaround  and  started
attacking McConnell for allowing the shutdown to happen in the first place. In this Bevin's talking
points were almost identical to the Democratic Senate candidate Alison Lundergan Grimes, whose
attack ad proclaimed that "Mitch McConnell can't light the house on fire and then take credit for
putting it out196."197
193 Gallup poll 26.2.2014, Boehner's Favorability Returns to Pre-Shutdown Levels.
194 CN-2 video segment of an interview of Senator Rand Paul on Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and the shutdown,
18.10.2013.
195 The Hill 18.10.2013, McConnell challenger nabs big endorsement.
196 ABC News 3.12.2013, McConnell Challenger, Matt Bevin, Scoffs at Chamber of Commerce Ad.
197 Talking Points Memo 10.9.2013, McConnell Opponent Matt Bevin Accuses GOP Of 'Absolute Surrender' On 
Obamacare;
Talking Points Memo 17.1.2014, McConnell Challenger Matt Bevin Now Says Shutdowns Are Bad.
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Perhaps Bevin was trying to pivot to more centrist position in preparation for the general election. If
so, it was to be in vain, since McConnell went on to win the primary elections in May of 2014 with
a 60.2% share of the vote. Alison Lundergan Grimes did not fare much better in November: she
only got 40.7% of the votes compared to McConnell's 56.2%. This also meant that McConnell
became the Senate Majority Leader for the 114th Congress.198
It is worth noting, as a final Kentucky side note, that Matt Bevin did not give up on politics. He
staged a surprise comeback in 2015, running for Governor on an anti-establishment platform that
had as its central message vehement opposition to Obamacare, which in Kentucky – one of the few
red  states  where  it  was  adopted  at  all  –  was  called  Kynect199.  Bevin  defeated  his  Democratic
challenger Jack Conway in the November 2015 elections with a vote share of 53% and became the
Governor. Many Republican strategists have taken this to mean that opposition of Obamacare still
remains a viable election strategy in the future.200
As  far  as  the  Congressional  Republican  leadership  team is  concerned,  the  most  surprising,  if
delayed, effect of the 2013 shutdown might arguably be its contribution to the unexpected political
demise of Majority Leader Eric Cantor in the summer of 2014. It bears repeating that attributing
Cantor's downfall solely to the shutdown is almost certainly too simplistic an approach: Cantor's
adviser  John Murray called  the event  "death by a  thousand cuts",  and one of  them – Cantor's
pragmatic stance on immigration, which was ruthlessly attacked by his opponent – was arguably
more damaging than his role in the 2013 government shutdown. Nevertheless, the shutdown may
have  played  an  important  role  in  Cantor's  primary  defeat,  and  since  the  defeat  had  important
repercussions to others in the Republican Congressional leadership team in the shutdown's wake, it
is worthwhile to briefly assess the connection between the two events.201
In  order  to  become  the  Republican  candidate  for  Virginia's  7th District  for  the  House  of
Representatives and to gain a chance to get re-elected for his eight term in the House, Cantor had to
beat a virtually unknown economy professor called Dave Brat. While Cantor had raised 5.4 million
dollars for his re-election war chest, Brat only had 200,000 dollars at his disposal. Other signs also
pointed to a one-sided race favoring Cantor: he had national name recognition, he held the second-
highest position in the Congressional leadership team and could allude to open speculation about
198 Politico election results page for 2014 statewide Kentucky elections.
199 Brill 2015, loc 3340–3350. (Chapter 13)
200 The Wall Street Journal 3.11.2015, Republican Matt Bevin Wins Kentucky Governor's Race.
201 FiveThirtyEight 20.6.2014, What We Can Learn From Eric Cantor's Defeat;
University of Virginia Center for Politics Sabato's Crystal Ball 12.6.2014, Cantor's fall.
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succeeding Boehner in the near future. Brat had the support of the conservative radio host Laura
Ingraham and some local Tea Party groups, but little else. And still, when the votes were counted on
June 10, 2014, Brat defeated Cantor by a wide margin of 55.5% to 44.5%.202
The shutdown might have been especially damaging for Cantor owing to reasons pertaining both to
his own role in the events as well as its oversized impact on Virginia. The last minute rule change
that made Cantor the only Representative with the power to initiate a vote on a clean Continuing
Resolution, which was intended to stave off moderate rebellion, meant that he became personally
associated with the Republican shutdown goals and the subsequent failure to reach them. He was
likewise personally associated with the failed approach of opening pieces of the government in a
piecemeal fashion. Due to its high number of federal employees the state of Virginia was hurt by the
shutdown more than most states, which may have served to amplify the crisis' negative effect on
Cantors  popularity,  just  as it  probably contributed to  Cuccinelli's  failed gubernatorial  run203.  To
make matters worse for Cantor, Virginia was embroiled in a statewide shutdown crisis of its own
over the implementation of Obamacare at the time of his primary contest with Brat, which must
have  reminded  many Virginians  of  Cantor's  role  in  the  national  shutdown only a  few months
earlier204. 
Dave Brat used all this to his advantage and pointed to Cantor's role in the shutdown in ads, op-eds
and speeches claiming that Cantor "voted to fully fund Obamacare" in the final vote that ended the
crisis205.  The shutdown was also identified as having been damaging to Cantor by many of his
allies206.  While  John  Murray was  likely  right  in  attributing  Cantor's  defeat  to  several  different
reasons, the 2013 government shutdown seems to have been one of them. This is significant given
that no Majority Leader – a position created in 1899 – had ever been ousted in a primary election
before207.
Cantor's  downfall  also  seems  to  have  worked  to  unravel  Boehner's  carefully  laid  plans  for
retirement. According to several of his close allies, Boehner had begun giving very serious thought
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in the weeks following the shutdown to leaving the Congress and passing along the Speakership to
Cantor. About to turn 64 years old and with just shy of seven million dollars in personal assets,
retirement might have looked quite enticing for Boehner. No matter how serious these thoughts had
been,  Cantor's  defeat  changed the  calculus.  The  next  man  in  line,  Cantor's  replacement  Kevin
McCarthy from California was deemed by most to be too inexperienced to take over the top job
immediately, and so Boehner had to stay.208
In the end, Boehner sacrificed himself in September of 2015 to stop another government shutdown.
The  point  of  contention  in  late  2015  was  the  classic  shutdown  theme,  abortion  rights,  with
conservative Republicans wanting to defund Planned Parenthood. Boehner's announcement of his
resignation by October averted the crisis as it made any threats to his leadership from his own
caucus  effectively  empty.209 The  heir  apparent  Kevin  McCarthy,  however,  was  unexpectedly
thwarted in his leadership ambitions after Boehner's announcement due to opposition from the same
conservatives that had often hounded Boehner, as well as persistent but unproven rumors about an
extra-marital affair with Representative Renee Ellmers210. After a period of intra-party turmoil, the
Speaker's gavel passed to the reluctant Paul Ryan211.
Boehner has been mostly but not completely quiet in his retirement. One subject in particular has
made him vocal,  and this  arguably harkens back to the 2013 government shutdown: Ted Cruz.
Using  the  amplified  national  interest  in  Cruz  provided  by  the  2016  Republican  presidential
primaries, Boehner famously called Cruz "Lucifer in the flesh", and said that "I get along with
almost everyone, but I have never worked with a more miserable son of a bitch in my life".212 As
much as Cruz might have grated Boehner, during the shutdown and otherwise, the shutdown seems
to have permanently catapulted Cruz into the ranks of nationally relevant Republican politicians.
Whether the shutdown was otherwise beneficial to him and the other leading defunders should now
be looked at.
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4.2. The shutdown's effect on the leading defunders
"I'm not serving in office because I desperately needed 99 new friends in the U.S. Senate."
Senator Ted Cruz, when asked how much his colleagues "despise" him after the shutdown.213
For its most visible proponent, Senate freshman Ted Cruz, the 2013 government shutdown brought
both widespread criticism and acclaim, both of which helped to solidify his newfound standing as a
national political figure – despised by many to be sure, but known by most nonetheless. When the
shutdown ended Cruz stuck to the highly confrontational style  that had characterized his entire
political  career,  and declared  that  the Washington establishment  had again failed  the  American
people, and that "had Senate Republicans united and supported House Republicans, the outcome of
this would have been very, very different, and I wish that had happened."214
The attacks against Cruz and his role in the shutdown took many forms. He got criticized by the
media: Bloomberg Business, for example, put Cruz in its cover dressed as the Mad Hatter next to a
caption proclaiming crazy as the new normal, while in Texas Houston Chronicle ran an editorial
titled "Missing Kay", in which the paper expressed regret over endorsing Cruz in his run to replace
Kay Bailey Hutchison in the Senate and speculated that the shutdown would not have occurred
without Cruz215. Moderate Republicans also continued to speak out against Cruz: Peter King of New
York, for example, said that Republicans have to start going after Cruz who had brought the country
"to the edge of ruin"216, while John McCain called Cruz "crazy" and said he was angry at him for
hurting Arizonians by pursuing a plan with "no chance of success"217.
For his own part, Cruz maintained that success had been possible, but that the quest for defunding
Obamacare was hampered by the refusal of the party elites in the Senate especially to oppose the
Democrats and to make their case to the public. Cruz outlined the plan he claims could have worked
in several speeches in the shutdown's aftermath218. He also described it in detail in his 2015 book "A
Time  for  Truth".  The  two  first  parts  of  his  four-point  plan,  mobilizing  voters  to  support  the
defunding effort and getting the House of Representatives to pass legislation defunding Obamacare,
succeeded according to Cruz. The third part of the plan, getting Senate Republicans to support their
213 ABC News 18.10.2013, Ted Cruz Not Looking for '99 New Friends' in the Senate.
214 NYT 17.10.2013, Hands Empty but Spirit Unbowed, House Republicans Take Stock.
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House colleagues, was where he thinks the plan failed due to active opposition of Mitch McConnell
and the broader Republican leadership, which then made impossible the final part of pressuring red-
state  Democrats  into  joining  the  Republicans  in  defunding Obamacare.  Cruz  maintains  that  an
aggressive  and  coordinated  campaign  of  public  outreach  pointing  out  the  willingness  of
Republicans to open specific parts of the government – a strategy Cruz claims he invented with
Mike Lee – would have ultimately turned Americans against Obama and Harry Reid and would
have brought them victory. Cruz also writes that he commissioned internal polling that indicated
that underlining this Republican strategy of opening the government in a piecemeal fashion had
much potential as a message.219
According to Cruz, the Republican establishment also reached out to the party's donor base and
made the case that Cruz and his allies, especially Mike Lee, should be deprived of further funding.
Speaking in March of 2015, Cruz said that "in 2013 we got quite a lot of money from D.C. PACs,
and when the defund fight happened, that dropped to almost zero."220 Cruz also alluded to this
punitive reaction in "A Time for Truth",  saying that  his  Political  Action Committee fund-raiser
actually quit in the aftermath of the shutdown due to pressure from people connected to the party
elite221. 
Hampering the fundraising efforts of unruly politicians can be an effective weapon for the elites of
any party, but it becomes less effective once the intended target reaches a certain level of national
visibility. Thus, for Cruz, the effects of such tactics were likely offset by the fundraising gains from
the  very  confrontation  he  claims  got  him  punished  by the  party  elites.  Cruz's  political  action
committee  received 800,000 Dollars  in  donations  during  the  three  month  period  preceding the
shutdown but covering his filibuster.  According to Cruz's State Director John Drogin, the period's
total fundraising haul for all of the different accounts supporting Cruz was 1.19 million Dollars
from 12,000 different donors. Mike Lee's PAC, on the other hand, received only 525 Dollars in the
same period despite the fact that he too played a central supporting role in the filibuster222.223
Cruz also received much in the way of positive feedback for his central role in the shutdown. The
accolades begun already during the shutdown, when on October 12 he won the annual presidential
219 Cruz 2015, loc 4082–4129,4162–4173,4190–4201.
220 The Washington Post 28.3.2015, Cruz claims GOP leadership blocked his fundraising after shutdown.
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straw poll at the Values Voter Summit224. After the government reopened, Cruz went on a speaking
tour in Texas and in Iowa, which is traditionally hosts the first presidential caucus of the primary
season. Texans mostly greeted him very enthusiastically and many observers noted that several
other  Texas  politicians  had  begun  modeling  their  behavior  after  Cruz's  modus  operandi.  His
reception in Iowa was also warm, even if he was not met with quite the same fervor as in his home
state. The Iowa trip, where he participated in a joint fundraising event hosted by Representative
Steve King, sparked immediate speculations about Cruz's presidential ambitions.225
Polls  conducted during the last  days  of the shutdown saw Cruz's  personal popularity skyrocket
among voters who identify themselves as Tea Party supporters. His earlier July popularity of 47%
shot  up  to  74%  among  these  voters,  while  his  unfavorability  rating  among  non-Tea  Party
Republicans rose by 15 percentage points to 31%.226 As Republican voters who identify themselves
as Tea Party types can be construed as being Cruz's base voters these combined developments can
be viewed as quite  fortunate for him,  especially when combined with the national  visibility he
gained from the government shutdown. For Cruz personally, then, the end result of the shutdown
was arguably net positive. As much as the scathing criticism in the media and the cold shoulders
from his colleagues may have hurt him politically, they also energized his supporters and enabled
him to eventually prove right those prognosticators who saw in his actions plans for the White
House.  In  March of  2015 Cruz became the  first  Republican to  announce  his  candidacy in  the
primaries227. He eventually lost the race to Donald Trump, albeit after winning the primaries in nine
different states and outperforming all the other losing candidates228.
If the shutdown's overall result for Ted Cruz was arguably favorable, then for Mike Lee the picture
is more muddled. In fact, Lee courted personal PR-disaster already at the beginning of the shutdown
when on October 1 he told a local Salt Lake City reporter that he would not be deferring or donating
to charity his pay during the shutdown, unlike many other Republicans such as Cruz or Utah's
senior Republican Senator Orrin Hatch. As news of Lee's stance started spreading, his spokesman
Brian Phillips started backpedalling on October 2, calling the original KUTV report "wrong", and
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announcing that Lee would be donating his pay to charity.229 The response was rapid enough to limit
the damage, especially since national media found a better targets in North Carolina Representative
Renee  Ellmers  and  Nebraska  Representative  Lee  Terry  who  showed  themselves  less  adept  in
responding to similar storylines and gave press several juicy quotes before deciding to forego their
pay230.
Lee's reception back home in Utah was less jubilant than Cruz's in Texas. Even if Lee's goal of
battling  Obamacare  was in  itself  popular,  the  negative  outcome of  the  shutdown caused many
prominent Utah politicians to publicly criticize Lee. Former Republican Governor and Lee's old
boss  Jon  Huntsman,  for  example,  said  there  was  now  "widespread  discontent"  among  Utah
Republicans over Lee's priorities, while Mitt Romney's 2012 national finance chairman Spenser
Zwick called Lee a "show horse" who "just wants a spectacle".231
Polling data confirms that Lee suffered politically for his role in the shutdown. Brigham Young
University Associate Professor Quin Monson found that Lee's favorability/unfavorability ratings
flipped from June 2013 Utah Voter Poll results of 50/41 to 40/51 in October 2013 – meaning that
the shutdown resulted in a ten percentage point drop in respondents viewing Lee in a favorable light
and a corresponding ten percentage point  increase in disfavourable views. A closer look at  the
polling  reveals  unsurprisingly  that  the  shutdown  hurt  Lee  especially  among  move  moderate
Republicans and Democrats, but not among Tea Party supporters.232
Lee  acknowledged  the  criticism  he  received,  but  remained  unapologetic  over  his  role  in  the
shutdown. "Some say we shouldn't have fought because we couldn't win," he said on the Senate
floor, "but this country wasn’t built by fighting when victory was absolutely certain"233. As for the
negative polling he was more dismissive, saying "The only number I worry about is how many
people are being hurt  by Obamacare".234 Polling data gathered a year later in October 2014 by
Brigham Young University Associate Professor Chris Kapowitz seems to vindicate Lee here: it took
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a year but his favorability/unfavorability ratings eventually returned close to their pre-shutdown
levels. Only the negative impact among Utah Democrats seems to have been permanent235.
Out  of  all  the  leading defunders,  Mark  Meadows adopted  the  least  combative  stance  once  the
shutdown got underway and also in its aftermath. He sought to downplay his own role in interviews
with local media and to discredit a widely-read CNN article236 that brought him national visibility
on the eve of the shutdown and that named him "architect of the brink" as well as "the man behind
the government shutdown"  237. After the shutdown ended, Meadows claimed that he had tried to
stop the shutdown from happening and that he had even worked with a White House Congressional
Liaison Officer, to the dismay of his own party members, to find ways to prevent the crisis 238. When
Meadows  asked  if  he  would  write  another  defunding  letter  in  time  for  the  next  Continuing
Resolution,  Meadows answered in the negative and claimed that the President had promised to
negotiate with the Republicans next time around239.
Meadows's  reluctance  to  highlight  his  role  in  the  shutdown  in  local  media  can  probably  be
explained by how severely the  crisis  impacted  his  district.  North  Carolina's  11th Congressional
District is made up over 500,000 people from mostly rural areas in the foothills of the Blue Ridge
Mountains. Large parts of the district are heavily dependent on tourism, with most of the tourists
arriving in the autumn to see the leaves turn to autumn colors. The shutdown induced closure of the
district's national parks therefore cost Meadows's constituents approximately one million dollars for
each day of the shutdown.240 The careful approach chosen by Meadows seems ultimately to have
worked as he was re-elected in 2014 with 62.9% of the vote241,  an improvement of almost 5.5
percentage points from his original 2012 tally of 57.4%242.
None  of  this  is  to  say  that  Meadows  became  any  less  confrontational  in  Congress  after  the
shutdown. The most dramatic of many examples of his opposition to Boehner and his leadership
team came in the summer of 2015, when Meadows led in June 33 other House Republicans in
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opposition to Boehner in a "rule motion" leading to a vote on President Obama's negotiation powers
for a Asian trade deal. Though a largely technical matter, the move was symbolic and rash enough
to  make  Boehner  temporarily  strip  Meadow's  chairmanship  of  the  Government  Operations
subcommittee. Meadows retaliated in July by calling for a "motion to vacate the chair", in essence
initiating a vote of no confidence against Boehner in a political maneuver not attempted in Congress
for a century. So even if Meadows did react to the shutdown by adopting a careful approach to
explaining his actions to his constituents back home, neither the crisis or any subsequent skirmishes
left him with any such compunctions towards the House leadership.243
243 Politico 20.6.2015, Chaffetz strips Meadows of subcommittee chairmanship;
Politico 28.7.2015, House conservative seeks Boehner's ouster.
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4.3. The shutdown's effect on the most vocal moderates
"It  didn’t  take a goddamned rocket  scientist  to  see how this  was going to  turn out.  When the
rainstorm came, we were all wearing cardboard shoes."
John McCain, on the end result of the shutdown.244
In many ways both the Republican Congressional leadership and the leading figures in the drive to
defund  Obamacare  had  clearer  stakes  in  the  shutdown  crisis  than  the  most  vocal  moderate
Republicans in Congress. The defunders sought the confrontation and the leadership had to navigate
the crisis, but nobody forced any of the moderates to speak out. The rationales for doing so likely
varied from a will to distance themselves in the eyes of voters back home from the more radical
defunders  to  a  genuine  concern  over  the  continuing  evolution  of  the  Republican  party and its
Congressional manifestation. In any case, and perhaps through the virtue of being vindicated by
events, the vocal moderates as a loose group seem to have been less affected by the shutdown's
aftermath than leading defunders or Republican leaders. Nevertheless, a brief review of the subject
is warranted.
The two most visible leaders of the abortive moderate mid-shutdown rebellion, Charlie Dent of
Pennsylvania and Peter T. King of New York, were both vocal in the aftermath of the crisis. Once it
became clear that the shutdown would end, Dent said of his role and his opponents, "People can
blame me all they want, but I was correct in my analysis and I’d say a lot of those folks were not
correct in theirs245." King in particular was very incensed. He said that the Republican party was
"going nuts" and criticized the end result  of the shutdown by saying: "After shutting down the
government for two and a half weeks, laying off 800,000 people, all the damage we caused, all we
would end up doing was taking away health insurance from congressional employees. That’s it?
That’s what you go to war for? That’s what we shut down the United States government for246?"
In December King channeled his anger at the defunders into a new organization, a Political Action
Committee  called  American  Leadership  PAC.  Reviving  earlier  speculation  about  running  for
President, King stated that the purpose of the PAC was to wrest control of the Republican party
from the Tea Party forces and defunders, saying "I want to create a presence for those like myself
who feel Rand Paul and Ted Cruz are out of touch with the American people. This is highlighted by
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the government shutdown, which was one of the worst political disasters we've ever had." On July
1, 2015, however, King stated that he would not be mounting a presidential campaign247.248
When deciding to speak out against the defunders in the shutdown's aftermath, neither Charlie Dent
nor Peter King seem to have had much to worry about in regards to their chances of getting re-
elected. For example, a poll conducted right after the shutdown by Democratic-affiliated MoveOn
and PPP found Charlie Dent leading a generic Democrat by a margin of 13%249. Neither Dent nor
King faced primary challengers in the lead up to the 2014 Congressional elections and Dent actually
ran unopposed in the general election itself, while King received more than two times as many
votes as his Democratic opponent250.
On the Senate side, the moderate dealmakers kept largely quiet in the aftermath of the shutdown.
Having helped bring about a deal to end the shutdown, neither Susan Collins nor Lisa Murkowski
nor Kelly Ayotte sought much national attention for their fait accompli. The same is true for Lamar
Alexander  who  had  a  central  role  in  advising  Mitch  McConnell  in  the  final  negotiations.
Murkowski probably spoke for many moderate Republicans at the end of the crisis when she said:
"I'm trying to forget it. Here we are. Here we are. We predicted it. Nobody wanted it to be this
way251."
In fact, there was only one moderate Republican Senator who really took it upon himself to promote
critical  review  of  the  defunding  strategy:  John  McCain  of  Arizona.  McCain  had  a  unique
perspective  on  the  alleged  and  often-invoked  mandate  from  the  American  people  to  oppose
President Obama's healthcare law – namely that he had campaigned and lost against Obamacare,
first against its nascent form as his party's presidential candidate in 2008, and then as a central Mitt
Romney surrogate in 2012. McCain brought this up openly during the shutdown: "[...] after the
2012 election, where I've traveled this country with passion. The first thing, saying, the first thing
we're  gonna  do  when  Mitt  Romney  is  President  of  the  United  States,  is  repeal  and  replace
Obamacare – and the American people spoke.252" After the shutdown ended, McCain made several
critical remarks on the crisis, for example: "I said it couldn’t succeed from the start and it didn’t. It
was a miserable failure and we must never do it again. And those responsible for it will be held
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accountable by the American people and I don’t care what party they are in.253" 
Projecting to the future McCain said: "there's a fight in our party and it has to be waged [...] but at
the end of the day we got to come together. Someplace along the line we forgot Ronald Reagan's
eleventh commandment. You know what it was? Don't speak ill of your fellow Republicans. And
we've done way too much of that254."
253 Fusion 31.10.2013, John McCain Calls Shutdown a "Miserable Failure" and Wants Accountability.
254 CNN 17.10.2013, McCain: No more shutdowns, 'I guarantee it'.
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4.4. The shutdown's effect on the Congressional Tea Party faction
"[It] is a culmination of what we said we were going to do. Mark Twain once said, 'do the right
thing and it will gratify some people and astonish the rest.' America's been a little astonished by us
doing the right thing in the last few days here in the House."
Tea Party aligned Representative Tim Huelskamp, on the shutdown.255
The blame game that resulted from the government shutdown also impacted the popularity of the
Tea  Party  movement  and  its  Congressional  standard  bearers.  A  PEW  Research  Center  poll
conducted between October 9 and 13 saw the Tea Party's favorability rating fall from June's 37% to
30% and the movement's unfavorability rating rise from 45% to 49%. Importantly, a lion's share of
the change towards a more negative opinion of the movement happened among voters identifying
themselves as moderate or liberal Republicans. Among these people the favorability rating of the
movement plummeted from June's 46% to 27%.256
The  downward  slide  continued  in  other  polls  conducted  after  the  shutdown.  A  CNN/ORC
International survey from October 18–20 found that the Tea Party movement had an unfavorability
rating of 56%, the highest ever  measured by CNN polling,  while  the favorability rating of the
movement was 28%257. A Gallup poll from December 5–8 saw another set of all-time negatives for
the movement, with 30% of Americans having a favorable view and 51% an unfavorable view.
Among Republicans, however, the numbers were 58% favorable and 28% unfavorable.258
Despite Nancy Pelosi's accusations, the overarching media narrative following the shutdown never
really had the Tea Party movement as the driving force behind the crisis.  Ted Cruz,  of course,
received very much national attention, but more as a singularly ambitious individual politician than
a representative of the Tea Party movement. Meanwhile in the House of Representatives, the fact
that the Tea Party Caucus Chair Michele Bachmann had already announced in May that she would
not  be seeking re-election in  2014 likely meant  that  she made for  a  less  juicy target  for post-
shutdown media incriminations259. Bachmann featured in several news pieces during the shutdown,
mostly  for  her  enthusiastic  comments  supporting  the  defunding  strategy,  such  as  saying  the
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shutdown made the House Republicans "happiest" they have been "in a long time"260, but faced less
media scrutiny afterwards.
Ultimately for the Tea Party movement, it can be argued that the kind of a loss in popularity that
was one of the results of the 2013 government shutdown is not as damaging as it might be for other
political movements. Due to the movements ideological location on the far right of the spectrum of
American  politics,  the  ideal  recipients  of  the  movements  messages  never  were  the  kind  of
moderates who ended up viewing the movement more negatively as a result of the shutdown. In
fact, opposition from moderates might actually serve to energize Tea Party activists. 
As one of the authors of "The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism", Theda
Skocpol, observed after the shutdown in June 2014, "The Tea Party isn’t about popularity; it’s about
leverage." Energized Tea Party activists, even when small in numbers and broadly disliked, can be
very successful in their efforts to influence national politics, Congressional balance of power and
the direction of the Republican party's evolution due to their excellent understanding of political
procedures and their unwavering commitment to their cause. Therefore the shutdown brought down
the  Tea  Party  movement's  popularity  without,  perhaps  paradoxically,  really  hurting  the
movement.261
260 Fox News video of Sean Hannity's interview of Michele Bachmann and Tim Huelskamp, 2.10.2013.
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5. Self-inflicted wounds
"When is a win not a win? When it belongs to the GOP. These are constant self-inflicted wounds."
Former Representative Tom Davis, on the shutdown.262
There is certain irony in the fact that the disastrous Republican strategy of defunding Obamacare
and  the  following  government  shutdown  were  intermingled  with  and  followed  by  an  equally
disastrous roll-out of the same law. Senator Roy Blunt of Missouri had a point when he, as part of
his critique of the recently ended shutdown, said, "We managed to divide ourselves on something
we were united on, over a goal that wasn't achievable. The President probably had the worst August
and early September any President could have had. And we managed to change the topic263." As bad
as President Obama's late summer months might have been, the implementation troubles that began
on October the first were in a class of their own. As the shutdown was fundamentally interlinked
with the healthcare law and its rollout, both politically and chronologically, a brief review of the
rollout's problems is necessary for providing the context for a final look at what the 2013 shutdown
reveals about the internal dynamics of Congressional Republicans.
Although  various  troubling  signs  regarding the  technological  readiness  of  the  online  insurance
exchanges  were  visible  over  the  summer  and  early  autumn  at  several  lower  levels  of  the
government  machine  overseeing  the  preparations,  communication  breaks  and  silo  thinking
prevented these warnings from being communicated horizontally to other departments as well as
vertically to higher levels of responsible government officials. Thus, aside from the postponement
by one year of the implementation off the individual mandate, or a few mild public remarks by
President Obama about small and unavoidable technology hiccups that would be quickly resolved,
there was within higher levels of the administration no sense or discourse, either public or private,
on the rollout of the law being anything but on track for success. The last days of September were
spent  focused  on  the  looming  shutdown.  The  sense  inside  Obama's  inner  circle  was  that  the
Republican intransigence would look all the more unfounded when the exchanges would spring into
action.264
The  first  reports  on  the  morning of  October  the  first  were  promising.  The federal  Obamacare
website covering the exchanges of thirty-six states received more than a million visitors already
262 The Washington Post 1.10.2013, How Republicans shatched defeat from the jaws of victory.
263 NYT 17.10.2013, Losing a Lot To Get Little.
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before seven o'clock in the morning. But in a few hours it became evident that the system was not
working properly, and that the identity verification part of the registration process especially was
keeping people from enrolling onto Obamacare. The administration took that as a capacity problem
borne from high demand and mostly focused on the shutdown in first hours of the day. News soon
broke that a lady from Illinois called Kathy had become the first person to have completed the
process and enrolled. This was supposed to be the first drop in a veritable torrent of registrations,
but as the second day of the shutdown started on October 2, only six people had managed to enroll
despite 2.8 million visits to the website.  Efforts to fix the identity verification were not having
immediate effect, and it became clear that most of the other parts of the process were similarly
riddled with problems. The total number of enrollees climed at a glacial pace: by the fourth day of
the shutdown, for instance, only 248 people had gotten through the whole process.265
The Obamacare rollout crisis ended up lasting much longer than the government shutdown. As the
government reopend on October 17, the incoming traffic to the federal Obamacare website had
slowed down to a trickle due to negative stories spreading in the media – and even still only three
out of every ten visitors could even access the site, let alone complete the registration.266 Most of the
early successes came from the states that opted into running their own healthcare exchanges. In all
of October a total of 106,185 people enrolled onto Obamacare, but only 26,794 of those did so
through the federal website – less than 5% of the administration target.267
The political effects of the rollout crisis were exacerbated for the Obama administration on October
29 by a breaking news story that revealed that the President's famous promise that people who liked
their health insurance could keep it under Obamacare had not been true, and that the administration
had known for more than three years about the millions of upcoming healthcare cancellations. The
fact that Obama had not lied on purpose, but rather had not been informed of the changed details of
his signature reform, did not make the political  fallout any less damaging.268 Obama's personal
favorability ratings continued their downward trend with his approval rating falling to 41% and his
disapproval  rating  rising  to  53% in  early  November  PEW Research  Center  poll.  When  asked
specifically about his handling of healthcare policy, only 37% of the respondents of the same poll
approved with 59% disapproving – a clear deterioration from January's numbers of 45% approval
and 47% disapproval.269
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The rollout of Obamacare continued to dominate news cycles and generate negative publicity for
the Obama administration well unto late December, at which point the technical rescue and bug
hunting operation spearheaded by a large team of high-profile private sector experts since mid-
October finally reached a technical tipping point and established normal operability to the federal
Obamacare website. The White House announced the final numbers for 2013 on December 29,
stating  that  1.1  million  people  had newly enrolled  through the  national  website  –  from which
975,000 people  had completed  the  process  in  December.  By the  final  deadline  for  enrollment,
March 31 in 2014, a grand total of 7.1 million Americans had registered. The administration's own
target of seven million was thus surpassed by 100,000 enrollees. But even if the end result was good
for  Obama and the  Democrats,  the  process  leading  up to  it  had  been  an  unmitigated  political
disaster.270
The  problems  related  to  the  roll  out  of  Obamacare  are  relevant  in  the  context  of  the  2013
government shutdown and the internal divisions of the Republican Congressional caucus because
many Republicans had foreseen the problems – in fact, an upcoming disaster had been a central
speaking point for many Republicans. Therefore the following contrafactual exercise is justified:
what  would have happened if  the Republicans had not adopted the shutdown strategy,  but had
instead kept the government open and let the Obamacare roll out troubles occur on their own? In
this  scenario,  dubbed the "Bad Samaritan  theory"  by Ted Cruz271,  the  Republicans  would have
refrained from dominating sixteen days worth of news cycles and avoided the negative effects of
the shutdown strategy, while allowing the limited amount of total media coverage, the so-called
newshole, to be filled almost entirely by stories politically harmful to President Obama and the
Democrats.
Cruz himself  described and dismissed the Bad Samaritan theory by saying "Basically,  inflict  a
bunch of harm on the American people and hope we benefit politically from it. What a terrible,
cynical approach. I am not interested in seeing the American people suffer just because my party
might  benefit  politically  if  they  blame  the  Democrats  for  the  foolish  policies  that  have  been
imposed272." Cynical or not, the theory has merit in underlining just how damaging the shutdown
was for the Republicans. On the one hand, assuming the Republicans believed their own talking
points  about  the  upcoming  problems  in  Obamacare  implementation,  the  theory  showcases  the
enormous missed opportunity that was discarded in favor of the shutdown strategy. On the other
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75
hand, it also highlights the fact that the slowly unfolding PR disaster that was the Obamacare roll
out actually served to mask and obfuscate the severity of the political damage that the Republicans
inflicted  on  themselves  by  shutting  down  the  governent.  Another  way  of  thinking  about  this
involves another contrafactual scenario: what if the Republicans had shut down the government on
the same day that the Obamacare exchanges were opened in a smooth and technically flawless way?
How severe would have the political damage to Republicans been then? And how long would it
have taken for their  popularity to return to their  pre-shutdown levels then? These questions are
relevant because they reflect lines of thinking available also the Congressional Republicans when
formulating the views that led to the shutdown strategy (even if they were operating without the
benefit of hindsight).
So, what kinds of internal divisions or factions within the Republican party were created or made
visible by and during the government shutdown of 2013? What factors can be used to explain the
emergence or existence of these specific divisions? How did the shutdown influence the balance of
power between these factions? Who were the winners and who were the losers? To some decree at
least, all of these questions can now be answered.
The  main  division  within  the  ranks  of  Congressional  Republicans  in  the  context  of  the  2013
government  shutdown  was  that  between  the  defunders  and  the  moderates  who  opposed  the
defunding strategy. This division first appeared in the late summer of 2013 when Congressional
Republicans divided themselves into those who signed either the Meadows or the Lee letter and to
those who declined to sign. This initial  division resulted in 14 Senate defunders and 80 House
defunders on the one side and 32 Senate non-defunders and 152 House non-defunders on the other.
Futher sub-divisions resulted from political pressure and individual calculations. Five Senators and
Representative Jeff Miller  of Florida gave into pressure and withdrew their  signatures from the
defunding letters. Moreover, 25 House Republicans came out publicly came out in the early days of
October in favor of ending the shutdown through a "clean" CR. Further five Representatives walked
back on initial support of the idea.
The final vote that ended the shutdown was in many ways the ultimate test to distinguish defunders
from more moderate Republicans. In the end, 87 Representatives and 27 Senators voted yes in the
final vote, while 144 Representatives and 18 Senators voted no. The majority of Republicans stuck
to the course they had chosen in the summer in regards to the letters: a total of 10 Senators and 81
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Representatives  deviated  from  the  signature-and-against-compromise  /  no-signature-and-for-
compromise line. Roughly speaking, then, the Republican Congressional caucus was divided into a
harder core of defunders who made up about a third of the whole caucus, and a more moderate
faction representing the remaining two thirds of the caucus. Despite some wobbling, particularly in
regards to the letters on the Senate side and the final vote on the House side, this mix of one third
defunders, two thirds moderates remained relatively constant throughout the shutdown.
How  to  explain  the  emergence  or  existence  of  these  factions  then?  Keeping  in  mind  the
methodological problems of explaining the actions of politicians, several factors can be said to have
informed and guided the division of Congressional Republicans into the defunder and non-defunder
factions, as well as the active and nationally visible core groups of both factions. Roughly speaking,
those Republicans who had experienced one or more of the previous government shutdown in the
United States were more likely to side with the moderates. The defunders on the other hand had on
average less years in Congress under their belts. Ideological factors also played an important part in
informing the adoption of stances. Tea Party affiliated politicians were much more likely to adopt a
harder line on the side of the defunders, and the same can be said in general of those Republicans
whose ideological leanings were far from the center. District safety also played an important role
with Republicans from safer districts being more likely to support the defunding strategy. To these
findings should be added Ryan Lizza's observation about the House Republican defunders mostly
hailing from Southern and Midwestern states and districts with mostly white voters. 
The important thing to keep in mind when assessing these factors is that they often co-exist with
each other. Thus it could be said that an imaginary typical defunder hails from a district or state that
elected him or her (usually him) relatively recently and with Tea Party support and based on a very
conservative  worldview  and that  said  district  or  state  has  historically  been  very  safe  for
Republicans.  An  imaginary  non-defunder  on  the  other  hand  is  a  non-Tea  Party  aligned,
ideologically moderate veteran of Congress from a competitive district or state.
What of winners and losers, then? How did the shutdown affect the balance of power within the
Congressional Republican caucus? Here the picture is more muddled. One way of looking at the
situation is by thinking of the shutdown as a valve that let off some of the pressure that had been
building up between contending factions within the party. Viewed like this, the shutdown can be
said  to  have  benefited  the  party  leadership,  which  for  some  time  afterwards  benefited  from
increased  room  to  maneuver,  having  given  the  hardliners  their  fight  and  the  moderates  their
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compromise. That this calmer period did not ultimately last very long does not make it any less real.
Some  individual  politicians  had  clearer  end  results  from  the  shutdown.  Boehner  navigated  a
difficult  situation  elegantly,  and  should  be  counted  among  the  winners  for  avoiding  political
damage, very much unlike Eric Cantor. For all the vocal moderates, as well as Meadows and Lee
from the defunder side and McConnell in the Senate leadership the end result was largely neutral:
they spent some time in the national spotlight but did not see their fortunes dramatically changed.
Finally, it can be argued that Ted Cruz was the big winner of the shutdown. It elevated him into
truly national  recognition  and  was  one  of  the  factors  enabling  him to  mount  a  very effective
presidential primary campaign in 2015 and 2016.
Cruz's success hints at a possible and consequential answer to Nancy Pelosis's Tea Party question.
Insofar  poll  numbers  are  looked at,  the  shutdown cost  the  Tea  Party faction,  but  arguably the
movement was not weakened, as it relies more on political leverage than popularity. But was the
2013 shutdown a Tea Party shutdown of government? The answer seems to be no, at least,  not
directly. The Tea Party phenomenon was one of the necessary ingredients of the crisis, and Tea
Party aligned politicians were certainly in the driver's seat. But unlike the mass protests that sparked
the movement in 2009, the 2013 shutdown did not result in large scale political mobilization – the
Million Vet March notwithstanding. Therefore the Tea Party's role in the 2013 shutdown leads to an
important question – one that the present thesis can not answer – which is that to which extent is the
original  grassroots-powered,  anti-establishment,  conservative  Tea  Party  phenomenon  being  co-
opted or upstaged for their personal purposes by the most luminous Tea Party stars such as Ted Cruz
or outsiders such as Donald Trump? The answer to this question has important ramifications for the
future development of the Republican party and United States as a whole.
In the final analysis, the 2013 government shutdown was a telling moment for the internal dynamics
of the Republican Congressional caucus. In a country as broad and populous as the United States of
America, the existence of a two-party system almost automatically leads to varying amounts of
intraparty strife.  Competing  factions  have  always  existed  within  the  parties,  in  easy or  uneasy
alliances,  vying for  power  and sometimes  leading to  dramatic  confrontations,  new balances  of
power  or  even  splinters  and  new parties.  Thus  the  2013  government  shutdown can,  from the
Republican  perspective,  be seen as  one of  the  culminations  in  a  especially turbulent  period  of
intraparty struggle that  started with the Tea Party revolution  of  2009.  Boiled  down to  its  very
essence,  the  shutdown  was  not  about  Obamacare,  which  in  fact  unites  Republicans  in  their
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opposition to it. Rather the conflict was about a familiar Tea Party era point of contention: whether
compromise in order to govern can trump ideological purity and standing up for one's convictions.
Despite  its  dramatic  nature,  the  shutdown  crisis  of  2013  did  not  resolve  this  issue  for  the
Republicans of the 113th Congress. And if in following Congresses they or their successors were to
find an answer, it could not possibly be permanent. The nature of American democracy makes it a




U.S. Senate (113th) Roll Call Vote number 219, held on 16.10.2013. Results available at: 
<http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?
congress=113&session=1&vote=00219> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
U.S. House of Representatives (113th) Roll Call Vote number 550, held on 16.10.2013. Results 
available at:
<http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll550.xml> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Letter from Representative Mark Meadows to Speaker of the House John Boehner and House 
Majority Leader Eric Cantor. Letter dated 21.8.2013.
Letter from Senator Mike Lee to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. Letter dated 25.7.2013.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), July-December 2013. Internet-version of the newspaper.
The New York Times (NYT), July-December 2013. Internet-version of the newspaper.
SECONDARY SOURCES:
Literature:
Austin Andrew & Levit Mindy, The Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases. Congressional 
Research Service, October 2013.
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31967.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Brass Clinton, Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects. Congressional
Research Service, September 2014.
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34680.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Brill Steven, America's Bitter Pill. Money, politics, backroom deals, and the fight to fix our broken 
80
healthcare system. E-book edition. Random House, New York City 2015.
Butler Stuart, Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans. The Heritage Lectures number 
218. The Heritage Foundation, 1989. A scanned version of the original publication available at:
<http://healthcarereform.procon.org/sourcefiles/1989_assuring_affordable_health_care_for_all_ame
ricans.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Constitution of the United States of America. Authenticated text version available at the website of 
the U.S. Government Printing Office, at: 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc50/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc50.pdf> [Accessed 
20.11.2016]
The Cook Political Report, Partisan Voting Index by State, 1994-2014. 2014. 
<http://cookpolitical.com/file/filename.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Cook Political Report, Partisan Voting Index – Districts of the 113th Congress. 2013. 
<http://cookpolitical.com/file/2013-04-47.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Activity During The Government Shutdown And Debt 
Limit Brinkmanship. October 2013.  
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/weekly_indicators_report_final.pdf> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Cruz Ted, A Time for Truth: Reigniting the Promise of America. E-book edition. HarperCollins, 
New York City, 2015.
Gervais Bryan & Morris Irwin, Black Tea, Green Tea, White Tea and Coffee: Understanding the 
Variation in Attachment to the Tea Party Among Members of Congress. Paper prepared for 
presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 
August 28-31, 2014.
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484776> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Gervais Bryan & Morris Irwin, Tea(s) and Coffee: Understanding the Variation in Attachment to 
the Tea Party Among Members of Congress. Paper presented for presentation at the Annual Meeting
81
of the Western Political Science Association, Las Vegas, Nevada, April 1-3, 2015. 
<http://www.academia.edu/11890522/Tea_s_and_Coffee_Understanding_the_Variation_in_Attach
ment_to_the_Tea_Party_Among_Members_of_Congress> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Graber Doris, Mass Media and American Politics. 8th Edition. CQ Press, Washington DC 2009.
Grant Alan, The American Political Process. 7th Edition. Routledge, New York 2004.
Hoff Samuel, Of Witches' Brew and Tea Party Too!: 2010 Delaware Senate Race. Article in the 
book Pendulum Swing. Edited by Larry Sabato. Pearson Education Inc., New York City 2011.
Hoffman Catherine, National Health Insurance – A Brief History of Reform Efforts in the U.S. The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, March 2009.
<https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7871.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Klemetti Anssi, Kertomuksia konservatismista. The New York Timesin Mitt Romney-narratiivit 
republikaanien näkymättömässä esivaalissa 2.11.2010 – 3.1.2012. Bachelor's thesis, University of 
Turku, 2012.
Lepore Jill, The Whites of Their Eyes, The Tea Party's Revolution and the Battle over American 
History. First paperback edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton 2011.
Masket Seth, The Perils of Holding a Tea Party at High Altitude: Colorado's Senate and 
Gubernatorial Races in 2010. Article in the book Pendulum Swing. Edited by Larry Sabato. Pearson
Education Inc., New York City 2011.
Musumeci Mary Beth, A Guide to the Supreme Court's Affordable Care Act Decision. The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Foundation, July 2012. 
<https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8332.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]





Paul Rand, The Tea Party Goes to Washington. Hachette Book Group, New York City 2011.
Sabato Larry, Pendulum Swing. Article in the book Pendulum Swing. Edited by Larry Sabato. 
Pearson Education Inc., New York City 2011.
Skocpol Theda & Williamson Vanessa, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican 
Conservatism. Oxford University Press, New York City 2012.
Tea Party Patriots, Defunding Obamacare Toolkit for Activists. Published in September 2013. 
<http://www.teapartypatriots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Tea-Party-Patriots-Defund-
Obamacare-Toolkit-Final.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Tollestrup Jessica, Federal Funding Gaps: A Brief Overview. Congressional Research Service, 
October 2013.
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20348.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Tollestrup Jessica, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction. Congressional 
Research Service, November 2014.
<http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%260BL%2BP%3C%3B3%0A> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Trende Sean, The Lost Majority – Why The Future Of Government Is Up For Graps – And Who 
Will Take It. Palgrave Macmillan, New York City 2012.




Williamson Vanessa, Skocpol Theda & Cogging John, The Tea Party and the Remaking of 
Republican Conservatism. Perspectives on Politics, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2011. Pages 25-43.




ABC News, McConnell Challenger, Matt Bevin, Scoffs at Chamber of Commerce Ad. ABC News 
news page, 3.12.2013. 
<http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/12/mcconnell-opponent-matt-bevin-fires-back-in-
kentucky-senate-squabble/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
ABC News, McConnell Challenger Says Nasty Primary Could Result in November Loss. ABC 
News news page, 20.5.2014. 
<http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/05/mcconnell-challenger-says-nasty-primary-could-
result-in-november-loss/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




ABC News, South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley Names Tim Scott to Replace Jim DeMint in 
Senate. ABC News news page, 17.12.2012. 
<http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/south-carolina-governor-nikki-haley-names-tim-scott/story?
id=17998117> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




ABC 11 News, Congresswoman Renee Ellmers Will Give Up Paycheck – After Nov 1. ABC 11 
News page, 4.10.2013.
<http://abc11.com/archive/9274425/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Al.com, Rep. Mo Broks on list of blame for government shutdown, according to website. Al.com 
news page (Alabama area news aggregator for The Birmingham News, Huntsville Times, and 




The Atlantic, Countdown to Shutdown: A Primer on Where Budget Wrangling Stands. The Atlantic 
news page, 30.9.2013. 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/countdown-to-shutdown-a-primer-on-where-
budget-wrangling-stands/280103/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Atlantic, The Ted Cruz Filibuster Paid Off – for Ted Cruz! The Atlantic news page, 15.10.2013.
<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/ted-cruz-filibuter-paid/309923/> [Accessed 
20.11.2016]













Brookings Institute, How Clinton Won the Government Shutdown Fight & Why Obama Will Too. 
Article in The Brookings Institute FixGov blog by Elaine Kamarc, 25.9.2013. 
<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/09/25-government-shutdown-clinton-obama-
gop-kamarck> [Accessed 20.11.2016]





CBS DC, 'Million Vet March' Storms D.C. Memorials. CBS DC news page, 13.10.2013.
<http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/10/13/million-vet-march-storms-d-c-war-memorials/> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
CNN, Architect of the brink: Meet the man behind the government shutdown. CNN news page, 
1.10.2013.
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/27/politics/house-tea-party/index.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
CNN, Cruz to CNN: 'I don't work for the party bosses in Washington'. Article in CNN's Political 
Ticker blog by Ashley Killough, 20.10.2013.
<http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/10/20/cruz-to-cnn-i-dont-work-for-the-party-bosses-in-
washington/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
















CNN, Rallier tells Obama to 'put the Quran down'. Article in CNN's Political Ticker blog by Ashley
Killough, Shannon Travis & Brian Rokus, 13.10.2013.
<http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/10/13/at-tea-party-like-rally-obama-told-to-put-the-
quran-down/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
CNN, Shutdown key issue in special Senate election. CNN new page, 16.10.2013.
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/16/politics/new-jersey-election-senate/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




CNN, 7 reasons Eric Canor lost. CNN news page, 11.6.2014.
<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/11/politics/why-eric-cantor-lost/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




Fivethirtyeight, What We Can Learn From Eric Cantor's Defeat. FiveThirtyEight news page, 
20.6.2014. <http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-we-can-learn-from-eric-cantors-defeat/> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]




Hendersonville Times-News, Meadows says he tried to avert shutdown, offset damage. Internet 








The Hill, Government shutdown looms over ObamaCare. The Hill news page, 23.7.2013.
<http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/312727-shutdown-looms-over-obamacare> [Accessed
20.11.2016]




Houston Chronicle, Missing Kay. Internet version of Houston Chronicle, 16.10.2013.
<http://www.pressreader.com/usa/houston-chronicle/20131016/281900180939474> [Accessed 
20.11.2016]
The Huffington Post, Here's A Tally Of Which House Republicans Are Ready To Fund The 
Government, No Strings Attached. The Huffington Post news page, 1.10.2013.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/01/house-republicans-clean-cr_n_4024755.html> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]




The Huffington Post, Richard Burr: Mike Lee Government Shutdown Threat 'Dumbest Idea I've 












NBC News, Ted Cruz Announces Presidential Bid. NBC News news page, 23.3.2015.
<http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/ted-cruz-announce-presidential-bid-monday-n328051>
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
NBC News, Ted Cruz in Iowa: Has he sown the seeds of a 2016 GOP presidential candidacy? NBC
News news page, 26.10.2013. 
<http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/ted-cruz-iowa-has-he-sown-seeds-2016-gop-presidential-
f8C11474500> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




The New Yorker, Where the G.O.P's Suicide Caucus Lives. Article in The New Yorker's Daily 
Comment blog by Ryan Lizza, 26.9.2013. 
<http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/where-the-g-o-p-s-suicide-caucus-lives> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
The New York Times, Eric Cantor Defeated by David Brat, Tea Party Challenger, in G.O.P. 




The New York Times, John Boehner, House Speaker, Will Resign From Congress. Internet version 
of The New York Times, 25.9.2015.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/us/john-boehner-to-resign-from-congress.html?_r=0> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
The New York Times, Support Is Thin for Tea Party, but It Retain Its Muscle. Article in The New 
York Times' The Upshot blog by Allison Kopicki, 24.6.2014.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/upshot/support-is-thin-for-tea-party-but-it-retains-its-
muscle.html?_r=0> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Nj.com, Cory Booker: A vote for Lonegan is a vote for shutdown. Nj.com news page (New Jersey 
area news aggregator for The Star Ledger, The Times of Trenton, The Jersey Journal, South Jersey 




Nj.com, Lonegan: The government shutdown cost me the election. Nj.com news page, 21.10.2013.
<http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/10/lonegan_the_government_shutdown_cost_me_the_e
lection.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
NPR, Boehner Blasts Tea Party Groups Over Budget Deal Criticism. NPR news page, 12.12.2013.
<http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2013/12/12/250555582/boehner-blisters-tea-party-
groups-over-budget-deal-criticism> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




Omaha World-Herald, Lee Terry says he 'cannot handle' giving up own paycheck during shutdown. 





Politico, Bachmann's fall. Politico news page, 29.5.2013.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/05/michele-bachmann-retiring-091978> [Accessed 
20.11.2016]
Politico, Chaffetz strips Meadows of subcommittee chairmanship. Politico news page, 20.6.2015.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/chaffetz-strips-meadows-of-subcommittee-chairmanship-
119252> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Politico, Cruz wins Values Voter straw poll. Politico news page, 12.10.2013.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/ted-cruz-values-voter-summit-straw-poll-098232> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Politico, House conservative seeks Boehner's ouster. Politico news page, 28.7.2015.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/house-conservative-john-boehner-ouster-120742> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Politico, McCarthy rumors follow Ellmers to North Carolina. Politico news page, 18.10.2015.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/ellmers-house-north-carolina-republicans-214903> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Politico, Obama to sign military pay bill. Politico news page, 30.9.2013.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/government-shutdown-senate-sends-obama-military-pay-
bill-97582.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Politico, Senate Conservatives Fund roils GOP. Politico news page, 29.9.2013.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/senate-conservatives-fund-roils-gop-97505.html> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]




Politico, Who is Rep. Mark Meadows? Politico news page, 28.7.2015.
<http://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/who-is-rep-mark-meadows-120757.html?ml=ri> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Politico, 4th Senator joins Tea Party Caucus. Politico news page, 27.1.2011.
<http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/48302.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]





















Roll Call, Senate Tea Party Caucus to Meet Jan 27. Roll Call news page, 14.11.2011.
<http://www.rollcall.com/news/-202509-1.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Salon, "Lucifer in the flesh": John Boehner emerges from retirement to absolutely torch Ted Cruz. 
Salon news page, 28.4.2016.
<http://www.salon.com/2016/04/28/lucifer_in_the_flesh_john_boehner_emerges_from_retirement_
to_absolutely_torch_ted_cruz/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Salt Lake Tribune, Mike Lee now says he'll donate pay during shutdown. Internet version of 
The Salt Lake Tribune, 3.10.2013.
<http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/politics/56951507-90/church-congressional-donate-
government.html.csp> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Slate, The Author of the "Defund Obamacare" Letter Doesn't Want to Write It Again. Article in 
Slate's Weigel blog by David Weigel, 18.10.2013. 
<http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2013/10/18/the_author_of_the_defund_obamacare_letter_does
n_t_want_to_write_it_again.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Smart Politics, Eric Cantor 1st House Majority Leader to Lose Renomination Bid in History. Smart 
Politics news page, 10.6.2014.
<http://editions.lib.umn.edu/smartpolitics/2014/06/10/eric-cantor-1st-house-majority/> [Accessed 
20.11.2016]
Talking Points Memo, Conservatives Desperately Move To Shut Down Government Over 
Obamacare. Talking Points Memo news page, 24.7.2013.
<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/conservatives-desperately-move-to-shut-down-government-
over-obamacare> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Talking Points Memo, McConnell Opponent Matt Bevin Accuses GOP Of 'Absolute Surrender' On 
Obamacare. Talking Points Memo news page, 10.9.2013.
<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/mcconnell-opponent-matt-bevin-accuses-gop-of-absolute-
surrender-on-obamacare?ref=fpb> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Talking Points Memo, McConnell Challenger Matt Bevin Now Says Shutdowns Are Bad. Talking 
93
Points Memo news page, 17.1.2014.
<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/mcconnell-challenger-matt-bevin-now-opposes-government-
shutdowns> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Talking Points Memo, Senior GOPer: Try To Ditch Obamacare? Dream On, Guys. Talking Points 
Memo news page, 25.7.2013.
<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/senior-goper-try-to-ditch-obamacare-dream-on-guys> [Accessed
20.11.2016]
Talking Points Memo, The House GOP's Little Rule Change That Guaranteed A Shutdown. Talking 
Points Memo news page, 10.10.2013. 
<http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/the-house-gop-s-little-rule-change-that-guaranteed-a-shutdown?
c=upworthy> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Time, How Eric Cantor Lost. Time news page, 10.6.2014.
<http://time.com/2854761/eric-cantor-dave-brat-virginia/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




University of Virginia Center for Politics Sabato's Crystal Ball, Cantor's fall. Article on the Sabato's
Crystall Ball page by Kyle Kondik and Geoffrey Skelley, 12.6.2014.
<http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/cantors-fall/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]









The Wall Street Journal, Republican Matt Bevin Wins Kentucky Governor's Race. Internet version 
of The Wall Street Journal, 3.11.2015.
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/republican-matt-bevin-wins-kentucky-governors-race-1446602627> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Wall Street Journal, Why Kevin McCarthy Came to Quite Speaker Race. Internet version of The
Wall Street Journal, 8.10.2015.
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-kevin-mccarthy-came-to-quit-speaker-race-1444348079> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, Absolutely everything you need to know about how the government shutdown
will work. Article in The Washington Post's Wonkblog blog by Brad Plumer, 30.9.2013.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/30/absolutely-everything-you-need-
to-know-about-how-the-government-shutdown-will-work/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, After hours of strife, lawmakers pass budget without Medicaid expansion. 




The Washington Post, Cruz claims GOP leadership blocked his fundraising after shutdown. Internet
version of the Washington Post, 28.3.2015.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/03/28/cruz-claims-gop-leadership-
blocked-his-fundraising-after-shutdown/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, David Vitter rides the tea party wave. Article in The Washington Post's Right 
Now blog by David Weigel, 10.4.2010. 
<http://voices.washingtonpost.com/right-now/2010/04/david_vitter_rides_the_tea_par.html> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, Democrat's lead the generic ballot by 8. That's not enough to win the 
95
majority. Article in The Washington Post's GovBeat blog by Reid Wilson, 22.10.2013. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/10/22/democrats-lead-the-generic-ballot-
by-8-thats-not-enough-to-win-the-majority/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, Here is every previous government shutdown, why they happened and how 
they ended. Article in The Washington Post's Wonkblog blog by Dylan Matthews, 25.9.2013. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/25/here-is-every-previous-
government-shutdown-why-they-happened-and-how-they-ended/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, How Republicans shatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Article in The 
Washington Post's The Fix blog by Chris Cillizza, 1.10.2013.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/10/01/how-republicans-snatched-defeat-
from-the-jaws-of-victory/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]




The Washington Post, In Iowa speech, Ted Cruz warns Democrats on shutdown. Internet version of 
The Washington Post, 26.10.2013.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/10/26/in-iowa-speech-ted-cruz-
warns-democrats-on-shutdown/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, In Utah, tea party favorite Sen. Lee faces GOP backlash over government 




The Washington Post, On cusp of shutdown, House conservatives excited, say they are doing the 





The Washington Post, Rep. Mark Meadows pushed for a shutdown. What did it bring his N.C. 




The Washington Post, Sen. Mike Lee: A political insider refashions himself as tea party 
revolutionary. Internet version of The Washington Post, 5.2.2011.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/04/AR2011020406719.html> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, Supreme Court to hear challenge to Obama’s health-care overhaul. Internet 
version of The Washington Post, 14.11.2011.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-challenge-to-obamas-health-care-
overhaul/2011/11/11/gIQALTvrKN_story.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, Ted Cruz returns to Texas as a hero who is reshaping the state of the 




The Washington Post, Ted Cruz wins Republican runoff for Texas Senate seat. Article in The 
Washington Post's The Fix blog by Sean Sullivan, 31.7.2012. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/ted-cruz-wins-republican-runoff-for-texas-
senate-seat/2012/07/31/gJQADsLtNX_blog.html> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, The Morning Plum: Are Dems turning on Obama? Yes. Does it matter? Not 




The Washington Post, Who voted against Boehner for speaker and why? Article in The Washington 
Post's The Fix blog by Aaron Blake, 3.1.2013.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/01/03/who-voted-against-boehner-for-
speaker-and-why/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post, Wonkbook: Three terrifying quotes on the debt ceiling. Article in The 
Washington Post's Wonkblog blog by Ezra Klein & Evan Soltas, 7.10.2013. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/07/wonkbook-three-terrifying-
quotes-on-the-debt-ceiling/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Washington Post Magazine, Is the biggest threat to Speaker of the House John Boehner the 





Brigham Young University Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Senator Lee and the 
Shutdown. Utah Voter Poll and commentary, 9.10.2013.
<http://utahdatapoints.com/2013/10/senator-lee-and-the-shutdown/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Brigham Young University Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy, Senator Lee 
Rebounds. Utah Voter Poll and commentary, 10.11.2014.
<http://utahdatapoints.com/2014/11/senator-lee-rebounds/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
CNN/ORC, Poll 12. CNN/ORC poll, 22.10.2013.
<http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/10/22/10-22-2013.gop-tea.party.poll.pdf> [Accessed 
20.11.2016]














Gallup, Tea Party Favorability Falls to Lowest Yet. A Gallup poll and commentary, 11.12.2013.
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/166217/tea-party-favorability-falls-lowest-yet.aspx> [Accessed 
20.11.2016]












PPP, Pennsylvania 15th Congressional District Survey Results. A PPP poll, 18.10.2013.
<http://s3.moveon.org/shutdownpolling/pa15results.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]








Federal Election Commission, Official Election Results For United States House Of 
Representatives. 2014. Available at: 
<http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2014/2014house.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Federal Election Commission, Official Election Results For United States Congress. 2012. 
Available at:
<http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/2012congresults.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The New York Times election results page for the 2016 presidential primary elections.
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/elections/primary-calendar-and-results.html> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Politico election results page for 2014 statewide Kentucky elections.
<http://www.politico.com/2014-election/results/kentucky/#.Vj-A4790TIU> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Virginia Department of Elections results page for the 2013 gubernatorial election.
<http://historical.elections.virginia.gov/elections/view/43843/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Other internet sources:





The Aspen Institute video of John McCain's interview in the Atlantic's Washington Ideas Forum 
2013 on November 14, 2013.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abibXoV1va0> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774 – present. The online edition, 
accessible at:
<http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
CN-2 video segment of an interview of Senator Rand Paul on Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
and the shutdown on October 18, 2013. 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n2gNLk-RAgc> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Congressional Budget Office, letter to Representative Paul Ryan, with the document Preliminary 
Analysis of the Rivlin-Ryan Health Care Proposal. Electronic version of the letter and analysis, 
17.11.2010. Available at the website of the Congressional Budget Office, at:
<https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/reports/11-17-rivlin-
ryan_preliminary_analysis.pdf> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
C-SPAN video of Boehner's weekly legislative briefing on December 12, 2013. 
<http://www.c-span.org/video/?316771-1/house-speaker-weekly-briefing> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
Fox News video of Sean Hannity's interview of Michele Bachmann and Tim Huelskamp on October
2, 2013. Available at:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xqb0qF53VI> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
FreedomWorks advocacy page with an electronic form for contacting Senator Cornyn and 
demanding that he sign the Mike Lee defunding letter.
<https://secure.freedomworks.org/site/Advocacy?cmd=display&page=UserAction&id=1167> 
[Accessed 20.11.2016]
Heritage Action Scorecard page. 
<http://www.heritageactionscorecard.com/members> [Accessed 20.11.2016] (Note: no direct link to
the scores for the 113th Congress exists – the option has to be chosen manually from the dropdown 
menu in the upper right hand corner of the page.)
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John McCain's video of  his own speech on the Senate floor on October 10, 2013. Available at: 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_igtw-5arU> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The Million Vet March website.
<http://vetmarch.com/> [Accessed 20.11.2016]





SNBC video of Rick Santelli's famous Tea Party rant on February 19, 2009. Available at:
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEZB4taSEoA> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The voteview.com website, which includes all the Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores used in 
this thesis. 
<http://voteview.com/rank_orders_all_congresses.htm> [Accessed 20.11.2016]
The 1995-1996 Government Shutdown section of the webpage of the Regional Oral History Office 
of the Bacroft Library of the University of California, Berkley research project "Slayig the Dragon 






Lamar Alexander (TN) YES NO NO 11 R + 12 0.324 46
Kelly Ayotte (NH) YES WITHDREW NO 3 D + 1 0.368 48
John Barrasso (WY) YES NO NO 7 R + 22 0.554 68
Roy Blunt (MO) YES NO NO 17 R + 5 0.453 52
John Boozman (AR) YES WITHDREW NO 13 R + 14 0.415 68
Richard Burr (NC) YES NO NO 19 R + 3 0.469 57
Saxby Chambliss (GA) YES NO NO 19 R + 6 0.435 52
Jeff Chiesa (NJ) YES YES NO 1 D + 6 0.251 32
Dan Coats (IN) YES NO NO 21 R + 5 0.370 59
Thad Cochran (MS) YES NO NO 43 R + 9 0.291 51
Susan Collins (ME) YES NO NO 17 D + 5 0.088 22
Bob Corker (TN) YES NO NO 7 R + 12 0.378 48
Deb Fischer (NE) YES YES NO 1 R + 12 0.488 65
Jeff Flake (AZ) YES NO NO 13 R + 7 0.958 59
Lindsey Graham (SC) YES NO NO 19 R + 8 0.422 47
Orrin Hatch (UT) YES NO NO 37 R + 22 0.388 52
John Hoeven (ND) YES NO NO 3 R + 10 0.339 41
Johnny Isakson (GA) YES NO NO 15 R + 6 0.416 49
Mike Johanns (NE) YES NO NO 5 R + 12 0.405 52
Mark Kirk (IL) YES WITHDREW NO 15 D + 8 0.286 37
John McCain (AZ) YES NO NO 31 R + 7 0.378 49
Mitch McConnell (KY) YES NO NO 29 R + 13 0.419 67
Jerry Moran (KS) YES NO YES 17 R + 12 0.431 67
Lisa Murkowski (AK) YES NO NO 13 R + 12 0.192 23
Rob Portman (OH) YES NO NO 17* R + 1 0.388 55
John Thune (SD) YES YES NO 15 R + 10 0.416 61
Roger Wicker (MS) YES WITHDREW NO 21 R + 9 0.388 45
Tom Coburn (OK) NO NO NO 15* R + 19 0.807 85
John Cornyn (TX) NO WITHDREW NO 13 R + 10 0.517 75
Mike Crapo (ID) NO YES NO 21 R + 18 0.501 81
Ted Cruz (TX) NO YES YES 1 R + 10 0.943 95
Mike Enzi (WY) NO YES NO 1 R + 22 0.552 70
Charles Grassley (IA) NO YES NO 39 D + 1 0.343 73
Dean Heller (NV) NO NO NO 9 D + 2 0.473 63
Ron Johnson (WI) NO NO NO 3 D + 2 0.677 81
Mike Lee (UT) NO YES YES 3 R + 22 0.986 97
Rand Paul (KY) NO YES YES 3 R + 13 0.974 93
Jim Risch (ID) NO YES NO 5 R + 18 0.672 84
Pat Roberts (KS) NO YES NO 33 R + 12 0.419 90
Marco Rubio (FL) NO YES " NO " 3 R + 2 0.579 82
Tim Scott (SC) NO NO " NO " 3 R + 8 0.731 86
Jeff Sessions (AL) NO NO NO 17 R + 14 0.545 85
Richard Shelby (AL) NO NO NO 35** R + 14 0.428 75
Pat Toomey (PA) NO NO NO 9 D + 1 0.656 67
David Vitter (LA) NO YES " NO " 15 R + 12 0.505 70
James Inhofe (OK) – YES NO 27 R + 19 0.556 79



















Spencer Bachus (AL) YES NO NO 21 R + 28 0.411 50
Lou Barletta (PA) YES NO NO 3 R + 6 0.276 40
Dan Benishek (MI) YES YES NO 3 R + 5 0.602 49
Gus Bilirakis (FL) YES YES YES 7 R + 7 0.393 59
John Boehner (OH) YES NO NO 23 R + 15 0.530 N/A
Charles Boustany (LA) YES NO NO 9 R + 19 0.427 46
Susan Brooks (IN) YES NO NO 1 R + 9 0.438 51
Vern Buchanan (FL) YES NO NO 7 R + 6 0.372 46
Ken Calvert (CA) YES NO NO 21 R + 10 0.371 38
Dave Camp (MI) YES NO NO 23 R + 5 0.397 49
Eric Cantor (VA) YES NO NO 13 R + 10 0.555 48
Shelley Moore Capito (WV) YES NO NO 13 R + 11 0.268 47
Howard Coble (NC) YES YES YES 29 R + 10 0.532 49
Mike Coffman (CO) YES, CLEAN CR NO YES 5 D + 1 0.563 62
Tom Cole (OK) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 11 R + 19 0.371 45
Paul Cook (CA) YES YES NO 1 R + 10 0.444 61
Tom Cotton (AR) YES NO NO 1 R + 15 0.689 82
Kevin Cramer (ND) YES NO NO 1 R + 10 0.346 38
Rick Crawford (AR) YES YES NO 3 R + 14 0.341 58
Ander Crenshaw (FL) YES NO YES 13 R + 19 0.358 43
Steve Daines (MT) YES YES NO 1 R + 7 0.501 58
Rodney Davis (IL) YES, CLEAN CR YES NO 1 EVEN 0.412 42
Charlie Dent (PA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 9 R + 2 0.264 36
Mario Diaz-Balart (FL) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 11 R + 5 0.308 32
Mike Fitzpatrick (PA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 5 R + 1 0.244 33
Jeff Fortenberry (NE) YES NO NO 9 R + 10 0.314 50
Rodney Frelinghuysen (NJ) YES NO NO 19 R + 6 0.307 42
Cory Gardner (CO) YES NO NO 3 R + 11 0.527 56
Jim Gerlach (PA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 11 R + 2 0.250 39
Chris Gibson (NY) YES NO NO 3 D + 1 0.232 26
Tim Griffin (AR) YES, CLEAN CR YES NO 3 R + 8 0.488 51
Michael Grimm (NY) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 3 R + 2 0.236 32
Brett Guthrie (KY) YES NO NO 5 R + 16 0.391 60
Richard Hanna (NY) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 3 R + 3 0.277 40
Gregg Harper (MS) YES NO NO 5 R + 14 0.422 42
Doc Hastings (WA) YES NO NO 19 R + 13 0.439 49
Joe Heck (NV) YES NO NO 3 EVEN 0.373 48
Jaime Herrera Beutler (WA) YES NO NO 3 R + 2 0.430 42
Darrell Issa (CA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 13 R + 4 0.541 54
Lynn Jenkins (KS) YES NO YES 5 R + 8 0.563 66
David Joyce (OH) YES NO NO 1 R + 4 0.316 44
Mike Kelly (PA) YES NO NO 3 R + 8 0.328 50
Peter King (NY) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 21 R + 1 0.283 35
Adam Kinzinger (IL) YES NO NO 3 R + 4 0.347 42
John Kline (MN) YES NO NO 11 R + 2 0.532 50
Leonard Lance (NJ) YES NO NO 5 R + 6 0.355 53
Tom Latham (IA) YES NO NO 19 EVEN 0.328 41
Frank LoBiondo (NJ) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 19 D + 1 0.218 42
Kevin McCarthy (CA) YES NO NO 7 R + 16 0.487 40
Patrick McHenry (NC) YES NO NO 9 R + 11 0.624 65
Buck McKeon (CA) YES NO NO 21 R + 3 0.419 40
David McKinley (WV) YES NO YES 3 R + 14 0.295 52





















Cathy McMorris Rodgers (WA) YES NO NO 9 R + 7 0.454 49
Pat Meehan (PA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 3 R + 2 0.244 39
Gary Miller (CA) YES NO YES 15 D + 5 0.500 50
Tim Murphy (PA) YES NO NO 11 R + 10 0.263 50
Devin Nunes (CA) YES NO NO 11 R + 10 0.502 37
Erik Paulsen (MN) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 5 R + 2 0.451 56
Robert Pittenger (NC) YES NO NO 1 R + 8 0.627 78
Dave Reichert (WA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 9 R + 1 0.241 38
Reid Ribble (WI) YES NO NO 3 R + 2 0.693 68
Scott Rigell (VA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 3 R + 2 0.501 63
Hal Rogers (KY) YES NO NO 33 R + 25 0.342 42
Mike Rogers (MI) YES NO NO 13 R + 2 0.434 51
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL) YES NO NO 25 R + 2 0.260 31
Peter Roskam (IL) YES NO NO 7 R + 4 0.474 50
Jon Runyan (NJ) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 3 R + 1 0.241 31
Aaron Schock (IL) YES YES NO 5 R + 11 0.345 45
John Shimkus (IL) YES NO NO 17 R + 14 0.401 40
Bill Shuster (PA) YES NO NO 13 R + 14 0.412 60
Mike Simpson (ID) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 15 R + 17 0.322 43
Adrian Smith (NE) YES NO YES 7 R + 23 0.539 59
Chris Smith (NJ) YES NO NO 33 R + 7 0.153 43
Steve Stivers (OH) YES NO NO 3 R + 6 0.350 51
Lee Terry (NE) YES NO NO 15 R + 4 0.464 61
Glenn Thompson (PA) YES NO NO 5 R + 8 0.334 43
Pat Tiberi (OH) YES NO NO 13 R + 8 0.420 53
Scott Tipton (CO) YES NO NO 3 R + 5 0.478 55
Fred Upton (MI) YES NO NO 27 R +1 0.346 46
David Valadao (CA) YES NO NO 1 D + 2 0.334 32
Daniel Webster (FL) YES NO NO 3 R + 6 0.481 56
Ed Whitfield (KY) YES NO NO 19 R + 18 0.318 43
Rob Wittman (VA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 7 R + 6 0.415 62
Frank Wolf (VA) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 33 R + 2 0.287 40
Steve Womack (AR) YES NO NO 3 R + 19 0.340 52
Don Young (AK) YES, CLEAN CR NO NO 41 R + 12 0.280 35
Todd Young (IN) YES NO NO 3 R + 9 0.544 52
Robert Aderholt (AL) NO NO YES 17 R + 28 0.376 56
Justin Amash (MI) NO YES YES 3 R + 4 0.898 88
Mark Amodei (NV) NO NO NO 3 R + 5 0.457 45
Michele Bachmann (MN) NO YES YES 7 R + 10 0.618 81
Andy Barr (KY) NO YES NO 1 R + 9 0.488 59
Joe Barton (TX) NO YES YES 29 R + 11 0.545 70
Kerry Bentivolio (MI) NO YES NO 1 R + 4 0.810 83
Rob Bishop (UT) NO YES YES 11 R + 27 0.563 70
Marsha Blackburn (TN) NO NO NO 11 R + 18 0.642 73
Diane Black (TN) NO YES YES 3 R + 21 0.601 60
Kevin Brady (TX) NO NO NO 17 R + 29 0.542 64
Jim Bridenstine (OK) NO YES YES 1 R + 18 0.832 91
Mo Brooks (AL) NO NO NO 3 R + 17 0.610 75
Paul Broun (GA) NO YES YES 7 R + 14 0.983 92
Larry Bucshon (IN) NO NO NO 3 R + 8 0.442 58
Michael Burgess (TX) NO NO YES 11 R + 20 0.581 81
John Campbell (CA) NO NO NO 9 R + 7 0.784 56
John Carter (TX) NO NO YES 11 R +12 0.501 55
Bill Cassidy (LA) NO YES YES 5 R + 21 0.477 58
Steve Chabot (OH) NO YES NO 17 R + 6 0.611 84
Jason Chaffetz (UT) NO NO NO 5 R + 28 0.719 69
Doug Collins (GA) NO YES NO 1 R + 30 0.696 81
Chris Collins (NY) NO NO NO 1 R + 8 0.397 44
Mike Conaway (TX) NO YES NO 9 R + 31 0.624 67
John Culberson (TX) NO NO YES 13 R + 13 0.529 66
Jeff Denham (CA) NO NO NO 3 R + 1 0.413 36
Ron DeSantis (FL) NO YES YES 1 R + 9 0.739 89
Scott DesJarlais (TN) NO NO NO 3 R + 18 0.569 82
Sean Duffy (WI) NO NO NO 3 R + 2 0.549 57
Jeff Duncan (SC) NO YES YES 3 R + 18 0.847 92
John Duncan (TN) NO YES YES 27 R + 20 0.631 83
Renee Ellmers (NC) NO NO NO 3 R + 10 0.451 51
Blake Farenthold (TX) NO YES YES 3 R + 13 0.551 64
Stephen Fincher (TN) NO NO YES 3 R + 19 0.570 66
Chuck Fleischmann (TN) NO YES NO 3 R + 16 0.515 68
John Fleming (LA) NO YES YES 5 R + 13 0.596 76
Bill Flores (TX) NO YES NO 3 R + 13 0.624 71
Randy Forbes (VA) NO NO NO 13 R + 4 0.426 52
VA Foxx (NC) NO NO NO 10 R + 11 0.695 73
Trent Franks (AZ) NO YES YES 11 R + 15 0.787 96
Scott Garrett (NJ) NO NO YES 11 R + 4 0.730 86
Bob Gibbs (OH) NO NO NO 3 R + 6 0.458 54
Phil Gingrey (GA) NO YES YES 11 R + 19 0.596 82
Louie Gohmert (TX) NO YES YES 9 R + 24 0.601 91
Bob Goodlatte (VA) NO NO NO 21 R + 12 0.508 70
Paul Gosar (AZ) NO YES YES 3 R + 20 0.588 77
Trey Gowdy (SC) NO NO YES 3 R + 15 0.742 87
Kay Granger (TX) NO NO NO 17 R + 19 0.419 52
Tom Graves (GA) NO YES NO 5 R + 26 0.871 80
Sam Graves (MO) NO YES NO 13 R + 12 0.471 60
Morgan Griffith (VA) NO NO NO 3 R + 15 0.558 54
Ralph Hall (TX) NO YES NO 33 R + 25 0.457 64
Andy Harris (MD) NO NO YES 3 R + 14 0.606 77
Vicky Hartzler (MO) NO NO YES 3 R + 13 0.526 60
Jeb Hensarling (TX) NO NO NO 11 R + 17 0.754 85
George Holding (NC) NO YES NO 1 R + 8 0.717 79
Richard Hudson (NC) NO YES NO 1 R + 11 0.730 72
Tim Huelskamp (KS) NO YES YES 3 R + 23 0.811 92
Bill Huizenga (MI) NO YES NO 3 R + 7 0.707 67
Randy Hultgren (IL) NO YES NO 3 R + 5 0.537 71
Duncan Hunter (CA) NO NO NO 5 R + 14 0.543 67
Robert Hurt (VA) NO NO NO 3 R + 5 0.610 68
Bill Johnson (OH) NO NO NO 3 R + 8 0.506 53
Sam Johnson (TX) NO NO NO 23 R + 17 0.630 76
Walter Jones (NC) NO, CLEAN CR YES YES 19 R + 11 0.211 71
Jim Jordan (OH) NO YES YES 7 R + 9 0.719 90
Steve King (IA) NO YES YES 11 R + 5 0.661 72
Jack Kingston (GA) NO YES NO 21 R + 9 0.567 81
Raul Labrador (ID) NO YES YES 3 R + 18 0.866 82
Doug LaMalfa (CA) NO YES NO 1 R + 10 0.600 67
Doug Lamborn (CO) NO YES YES 7 R + 13 0.729 84
James Lankford (OK) NO NO NO 3 R + 12 0.580 80
Bob Latta (OH) NO NO NO 7 R + 7 0.541 64
Billy Long (MO) NO NO NO 3 R + 19 0.628 70
Frank Lucas (OK) NO NO NO 21 R + 26 0.380 49
Blaine Luetkemeyer (MO) NO NO YES 5 R + 13 0.487 53
Cynthia Lummis (WY) NO YES YES 5 R + 2 0.703 72
Kenny Marchant (TX) NO YES YES 9 R + 13 0.622 87
Tom Marino (PA) NO YES NO 3 R + 12 0.378 51
Thomas Massie (KY) NO YES YES 3 R + 16 0.980 76
Michael McCaul (TX) NO NO NO 9 R + 11 0.466 64
Tom McClintock (CA) NO YES YES 5 R + 10 0.807 90
Mark Meadows (NC) NO YES YES 1 R + 13 0.662 85
Luke Messer (IN) NO YES NO 1 R + 12 0.593 68
John Mica (FL) NO NO NO 21 R + 4 0.476 72
Jeff Miller (FL) NO WITHDREW NO 13 R + 21 0.665 72
Candice Miller (MI) NO NO NO 11 R + 6 0.352 64
Markwayne Mullin (OK) NO NO NO 1 R + 20 0.528 59
Mick Mulvaney (SC) NO YES YES 3 R + 9 0.870 86
Randy Neugebauer (TX) NO YES YES 11 R + 26 0.656 83
Kristi Noem (SD) NO NO NO 3 R + 10 0.382 51
Rich Nugent (FL) NO NO YES 3 R + 11 0.535 67
Alan Nunnelee (MS) NO NO NO 3 R + 16 0.503 61
Pete Olson (TX) NO NO NO 5 R + 15 0.560 78
Steven Palazzo (MS) NO YES YES 3 R + 21 0.514 65
Steve Pearce (NM) NO YES YES 9 R + 5 0.493 60
Scott Perry (PA) NO YES NO 1 R + 9 0.645 78
Tom Petri (WI) NO NO NO 35 R + 5 0.383 61
Joe Pitts (PA) NO YES NO 17 R + 4 0.577 67
Ted Poe (TX) NO YES YES 9 R + 16 0.627 74
Mike Pompeo (KS) NO YES NO 3 R + 14 0.717 87
Bill Posey (FL) NO YES NO 5 R + 9 0.501 68
Tom Price (GA) NO NO YES 9 R + 14 0.680 78
Trey Radel (FL) NO NO NO 1 R + 12 0.725 87
Tom Reed (NY) NO NO NO 5 R + 3 0.374 41
Jim Renacci (OH) NO NO NO 3 R + 6 0.445 55
Tom Rice (SC) NO NO NO 1 R + 7 0.664 67
Martha Roby (AL) NO NO NO 3 R + 17 0.359 47
Phil Roe (TN) NO YES NO 5 R + 25 0.507 59
Mike Rogers (AL) NO NO NO 11 R + 16 0.346 58
Dana Rohrabacher (CA) NO NO NO 25 R + 7 0.660 75
Todd Rokita (IN) NO YES YES 3 R + 11 0.671 71
Tom Rooney (FL) NO NO NO 5 R + 10 0.509 61
Dennis Ross (FL) NO, CLEAN CR NO YES 3 R + 6 0.604 61
Keith Rothfus (PA) NO YES NO 1 R + 9 0.488 66
Ed Royce (CA) NO NO YES 21 R + 5 0.715 66
Paul Ryan (WI) NO NO NO 15 R + 3 0.586 58
Matt Salmon (AZ) NO YES YES 7 R + 17 0.720 94
Mark Sanford (SC) NO NO YES 7* R + 11 0.881 78
Steve Scalise (LA) NO YES YES 7 R + 26 0.597 76
David Schweikert (AZ) NO YES YES 3 R + 12 0.715 92
Austin Scott (GA) NO NO NO 3 R + 15 0.623 76
Jim Sensenbrenner (WI) NO YES NO 35 R + 13 0.672 78
Pete Sessions (TX) NO NO YES 17 R + 10 0.620 68
Jason Smith (MO) NO YES NO 1 R + 17 0.634 67
Lamar Smith (TX) NO NO YES 27 R + 12 0.426 69
Steve Southerland (FL) NO NO NO 3 R + 6 0.598 59
Chris Stewart (UT) NO NO NO 1 R + 18 0.505 64
Steve Stockman (TX) NO YES NO 35* R + 25 0.974 90
Marlin Stutzman (IN) NO YES NO 5 R + 13 0.824 83
Mac Thornberry (TX) NO NO NO 19 R + 32 0.568 67
Mike Turner (OH) NO NO NO 11 R + 3 0.284 44
Ann Wagner (MO) NO NO NO 1 R + 8 0.481 57
Tim Walberg (MI) NO YES YES 5 R + 3 0.563 63
Greg Walden (OR) NO NO NO 15 R + 10 0.362 48
Jackie Walorski (IN) NO YES NO 1 R + 6 0.419 56
Randy Weber (TX) NO YES NO 1 R + 12 0.828 83
Brad Wenstrup (OH) NO YES NO 1 R + 8 0.593 74
Lynn Westmoreland (GA) NO NO YES 9 R + 19 0.713 78
Roger Williams (TX) NO NO NO 1 R + 12 0.622 79
Joe Wilson (SC) NO YES YES 13 R + 16 0.584 70
Rob Woodall (GA) NO NO NO 3 R + 14 0.757 71
Kevin Yoder (KS) NO NO NO 3 R + 6 0.624 68
Ted Yoho (FL) NO YES YES 1 R + 14 0.850 72
C.W. Bill Young (FL) –, CLEAN CR NO NO 43 R + 1 0.333 59
Years in Congress counted from the end of 2013 (ie. figures are rouded up by 2.5 months).
* = Member's years in Congress are non-consequtive.
** =Member has changed parties at some point in his/her career.
Florida = FL, Georgia = GA, Hawaii = HI, Idaho = ID, Illinois = IL, Indiana = IN, Iowa = IA, Kansas = KS, Kentucky = KY, Louisiana = LA, Maine = ME,
Maryland = MD, Massachusetts = MA, Michigan = MI, Minnesota = MN, Mississippi = MS, Missouri = MO, Montana = MT, Nebraska = NE, Nevada = NV, 
New Hampshire = NH, New Jersey = NJ, New Mexico = NM, New York = NY, North Carolina = NC, North Dakota = ND, Ohio = OH, Oklahoma = OK,
Oregon = OR, Pennsylvania = PA, Rhode Island = RI, South Carolina = SC, South Dakota = SD, Tennessee = TN, Texas = TX, Utah = UT, Vermont = VT,
Virginia = VA,Washington = WA, West Virginia = WV, Wisconsin = WI, Wyoming = WY.
SOURCES
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress 1774 – present
Voteview.com Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores
Heritage Action Scorecard
State name abbreviations: Alabama = AL, Alaska = AK, Arizona = AZ, Arkansas = AR, California = CA, Colorado = CO, Connecticut = CT, Delaware = DE,
